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INTRODUCTION

In a landmark ruling, issued on March 22, 2011, Judge Chin of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that Google's proposed Books Settlement violated the
principles of copyright law.' In essence, Judge Chin reasoned that
any agreement which allowed the prerogatives of copyright to be
taken from authors without their explicit consent went against
accepted copyright norms. The fundamentals of copyright law
demand that an author must consent to any commercial use of his
or her work. In particular, the proposal that authors who could not
be located would eventually forfeit their rights raised grave doubts
in the judge's mind about the legality of such arrangements. The
Google Books Settlement would have also allowed Google to
digitize books and display "snippets" of them to the public without
explicit permission from their authors or publishers. Google's
argument that the display of such snippets was allowable within
the definition of fair use under U.S. copyright law failed.
In fact, the Google Books decision is of immense significance,
not only for U.S. copyright law, but also for moral rights. If the
display of snippets was a violation of copyright law, there can be
no doubt that it could also violate the author's moral right to
maintain the integrity of his or her work.2 The electronic, possibly
random, generation of excerpts, whether or not they expressed
I

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
In fact, this approach was taken in France, where the Cour de Cassation supported
the view that showing snippets might amount to a distortion of copyright works that
would violate the moral right of integrity under French copyright law. For a summary of
the case, see Bill Rosenblatt, French Court Finds Google Guilty over Book Scanning,
2

COPYRIGHT

AND

TECHNOLOGY

(Dec.

20,

2009),

http://copyrightandtechnology.com/2009/12/20/french-court-finds-google-guilty-overbook-scanning; see also Catherine Neilan, FEP Want "Serious Discussions" with Google
after French Fine, BOOKSELLER.COM (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.thebookseller.com/
news/fep-want-serious-discussions-google-after-french-fine.html.
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complete thoughts, the appearance of excerpts in collections of
works, and the presence of on-screen advertising could all be
factors affecting the perception of a work by the reader of the
snippet, leading to possible violations of its integrity. It might be
comforting to think that these concerns only apply outside the
United States, since American law has yet to include moral rights
for the authors of books in its copyright law. However, Judge Chin
also makes a strong appeal to the U.S. Congress for copyright law
reform, arguing that both technology and international law demand
a legislative response. 3 The points that he raises are directly
relevant to the future of moral rights in the United States and offer
strong support to the case for moral rights reform.
The Google Books decision is a stark illustration of the conflict
that is bound to ignite around rapidly evolving digital technologies.
Judge Chin's decision outlines both the opportunities and
challenges associated with technological advances.
As he
to
scan,
store,
and
technology
developed
by
Google
observes, the
make "searchable" vast quantities of information is truly
extraordinary.4 It holds the promise of revolutionizing access to
knowledge. At the same time, should a private corporation engage
in this exercise at the cost of publishers' rights, authors' rights,
privacy, and competitiveness, and with a view to commercial
profit? The conflict in this case raises the question of who should
control access to knowledge in a digital society. At a more
fundamental level, the contrast is also between free access and
restriction, though Google has ultimately proven to be a poor
advocate for the principle of freedom of information.
The economic aspects of freedom of choice received a clear
and powerful exploration at the hands of Judge Chin. What Judge
Chin could not examine, at least overtly, was the related question
of authors' non-economic interests and, arguably, rights in their
work. Judge Chin's analysis was largely limited to the territory of
U.S. copyright law. And yet, his decision also voices concern
about international law and the implications of Google's

See generallyAuthors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666.
4

See id. at 670.
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technology in the international community.5 In this sense, Judge
Chin's decision has a visionary quality. Technology is global. Its
range is not limited by national borders. From Google's point of
view, future growth seems certain to depend on the company's
international reach. At the same time, the United States is no
longer an individual player in copyright matters: it is, by its own
choice, a member of the international copyright community and,
indeed, a preeminent leader of that group.6
This Article considers the moral rights implications of new
technology, with a particular interest in the possibility of "free"
access to knowledge and what it implies from a moral rights point
of view. It explores four movements that represent distinctive
manifestations of the free access principle: Creative Commons,
Free Software, Wikipedia, and Google Books. The objective is not
only to analyze the "legality" of these technological phenomenawhether or not they violate accepted principles of moral rights
protection in various countries of the world and at the international
level. Rather, moral rights also serve as a lens through which the
broader impact of free access movements on knowledge and
culture can be examined. Judge Chin's decision in Google Books
runs neatly parallel to this discussion and, importantly, affirms the
need for legislative reform to address technology and its global
reach. The far-reaching implications of this judgment include
consequences for moral rights, in the United States and elsewhere.

s

Id. at 684-86.

The United States joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works in 1988, with effect from 1989. It was also the dominant force behind the
adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. See Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised,Paris, July 24, 1971,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocswoOO1.html; and Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C to Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal e/27TRIPs Agreement], available at
trips 01 e.htm. Notification of accession by the United States is available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty beme_121.html (last visited
July 14, 2011).
6

CREATIVE COMMONS
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MORAL RIGHTS: AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY

In a world that is deeply divided on copyright issues, the moral
rights of authors enjoy near-universal support. Through specific
provisions in copyright legislation around the world, moral rights
seek to protect the non-commercial interests of those who create
works. Typical moral rights include an author's right to be named
as the author of his or her own work-"attribution"--and the right
to object to mutilations or distortions of the work-"integrity."
The term "moral rights" is actually a poor translation from the
French droit moral. The concept of copyright protection for
"moral rights" originates in the laws of Continental Europe, with
particularly close ties to France and Germany, but the rights are not
necessarily "moral" in the English sense of the term. Rather, the
purpose of moral rights is to protect creativity and personality. In
this sense, the German expression-Persnlichkeitsrecht, or
personality rights-may well be preferable to the French, in
conveying the sense of the rights most accurately to English
speakers. Throughout the 20th century, the concept of moral rights
protection has become increasingly popular worldwide. Countries
across all levels of development, representing diverse legal
systems and cultures, have all embraced the protection of moral
rights.
On this stage, however, the United States remains a poor
player. It is the world's leading proponent of higher copyright
standards, and has spent the better part of two decades struggling
for consensus on copyright protection at the international level.
And yet, moral rights remain without substantial legal protection in
the United States.
Why are moral rights so popular elsewhere? The concept
behind moral rights is to offer protection to an author's personal
interests in his or her own work. As such, the appeal of moral
rights is often intuitive. The focus of moral rights is not on
corporations or commerce. Instead, from sculpture to song, their
aim is to offer legal protection for an author's right to be
acknowledged as the creator of his or her own work.7 To an
This right is generally known as the right of "attribution." MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN,
MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 12 (2011) [hereinafter
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extent, moral rights can also protect the integrity of creative works,
empowering authors and artists to protest damaging or demeaning
treatment of their work.8
Basic protection for moral rights is generally assured
throughout the world by the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, the founding agreement of
international copyright relations. 9 The Berne Convention was
established in 1886, and it is currently administered at the United
Nations by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).'o
Virtually every country in the world is now a member of the Berne
Union. The moral rights of attribution and integrity have been
protected in Article 6bis of the Convention since 1928.11 Many
European countries, and a number of developing countries, have
traditions of recognizing moral rights that substantially predate the
Berne provisions, and they continue to offer higher levels of
protection than the basic standard for moral rights articulated in

Berne.12

MORAL RIGHTS]. The earlier terminology of "paternity," for obvious reasons, is no
longer favored. See id. at 33. Commentators are divided on whether the right of
attribution as it is framed in Article 6bis of the Beme Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works also protects an author against the false attribution of
someone else's work to him-the problem of forgery. See id at 33-34, nn.4-5.
8
This right is usually known as a right of "integrity." See id. at 34. It is sometimes
also called a right of "reputation," and, in a sense, this terminology may actually be more
accurate. Id According to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, an author can only
protest damage to his work that endangers his reputation. id at 12. He or she must offer
proof of damage to reputation. See id. In contrast, under French law, there is no
requirement of proving damage to reputation. See id at 34.
9
Berne Convention, supra note 6.
10 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&startyear-ANY&en
d_year-ANY&search_what-C&treaty id=15.
i
Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203,
1211 (2002).
12 See SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 49-50. This protection
usually took the form of case-by-case judgments, as in the French example, jurisprudence
by scholars, as in Germany, or traditions of legal and aesthetic theory pre-dating
colonialism in developing countries, such as India. See id Italy claims to have
recognized moral rights since Roman times. See id.
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The United States joined the Berne Convention at the relatively
late date of 1988.13 This event was one of immense significance
for the world of copyright. For the first time, it signified fullfledged American membership in the international copyright
community. Structural features had made Berne membership a
difficult issue-the Convention required the automatic grant of
copyright to an author, arising simply out of the act of creating the
work, and forbade formalities such as the mandatory registration of
copyright ownership, traditionally a cornerstone of the U.S.
copyright system. 14 Hoping to find a viable alternative to isolation,
the United States joined the Universal Copyright Convention
("UCC"), in 1971.s Developed by the United Nations Education,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") in 1952, the
UCC was closely aligned with the norms of U.S. copyright
However, limited international acceptance of this
practice.
agreement made it nothing better than a temporary solution.17
Indeed, by the 1980s, membership in Berne was perceived as an
essential step towards defining a leadership role for the United
States in the international copyright arena. Above all, Berne
membership was a legal prerequisite to the adoption of the
Agreement on Trade-Related As ects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs") at the WTO,' the leading new copyright
agreement of its age. Negotiated by the United States and its
trading partners, TRIPs exploited the knowledge of copyright
13

The United States officially became a member of the Berne Convention on

November 16, 1988. See Treaties and ContractingParties,WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.

ORG. (WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty id=1045C.
14 Beme Convention, supra note 6, art. 5.
1s
See Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), Sept. 6, 1952, as revised, Paris, July
24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (entered into force July 10, 1974) [hereinafter UCC]
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=15381&URL DO=DO
TOPIC&URL SECTION=201.html.
16

See id; see also EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 58 (1980).
17 See PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 57-60 (discussing the genesis of the

UCC). Ploman and Hamilton comment that the "abolition of all formalities for the
establishment of copyright was one of the reasons why many countries, particularly in the
Western hemisphere, felt unable to accede to the Berne Convention." Id. at 59. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union, from 1974, have acceded to this treaty. See MIRA T.
SUNDARA RAJAN, COPYRIGHT & CREATIVE FREEDOM 102-07 (2006).
18

TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6.
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acquired in more than a century of the Berne Convention, by
requiring member countries of the WTO to adhere to its
provisions. 19
When the United States joined Berne, there were at least two
glaring inconsistencies between the U.S. copyright system and
Berne practices. In the first place, the United States had a
registration-based system of copyright. 20 The origins of this
system lie in the U.S. Constitution, which defines copyright in
primarily utilitarian terms; its purpose is to "promote the progress
of science and useful arts," and the "limited monopoly" granted to
authors and inventors was justified for this reason alone. 2 1 In
contrast, the Berne Convention approaches copyright as a matter of
natural rights. It requires automatic protection for authors' works:
protection arises out of the act of creation, and must be provided
"without formalities."22 Secondly, in keeping with this natural
rights approach, the Berne Convention also requires that member
countries must protect the moral rights of authors.2 3 Taken
together, these two features of the Berne system could not be
reconciled with American copyright tradition.
United States accession to the Berne Convention necessarily
entailed copyright reform. As far as registration is concerned, the
United States has moved gracefully from a registration-based
system to one where copyright is now recognized automatically. 24
However, implementation of a commitment to moral rights in
American copyright law has proven to be more complicated.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Andreas F. Lowenfeld assess the combination of
trade penalties with intellectual property rights as one of the two most significant
achievements of the WTO. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs andDispute Settlement Together, 37
19

VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1997).
20 See 2-7 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.01[A]

(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010); SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 140.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
22 Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
23 Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
24 See Richard Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 123, 124 (2002). It should be noted that the
combination of automatic protection with American mechanisms for the automatic
transfer of copyright from individuals to corporations translates into a significant new
standard of corporate power in American copyright law.

2011]

CREATIVE COMMONS

913

In fact, there are at least three possible routes to achieving the
goal of harmonizing United States law with Berne requirements:
comprehensive legal reform, specialized law reform, and case
precedent. The first, and most straightforward, solution would be
general reform of the U.S. Copyright Act to include moral rights
protection. From a purely legal perspective, this might be the
simplest alternative; for political reasons, however, it has proven to
be untenable. Instead, a second approach has been feasible:
limited legislative reform leading to the adoption of highly
specialized provisions on moral rights. In particular, the Visual
Artists' Rights Act of 1990 is often cited as the sole example of
moral rights legislation in the United States, and its aim is to
protect moral rights in works of visual art only. 25
Is this legislative scheme sufficient? It depends on how we
assess it. In relation to the Berne Convention, the defining aspects
of moral rights can be summarized in three statements. First, the
interests to be protected are attribution and integrity-at least, to
the extent that mistreatment of the work may cause harm to an
author's reputation.26 Secondly, the rights are to be protected
automatically, and without the need for any formalities: moral
rights arise directly out of the act of creating a work.2 7 It should be
noted, once again, that the same holds true for copyright as a whole
in the Berne system. Indeed, the right to release one's work to the
public has both an economic aspect-the right to authorize first
publication of one's work-and a moral dimension-the right of
disclosure. Thirdly, the Berne Convention provides that at least
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). A similar approach is
taken in Canada, which offers general protection for the moral rights of authors, but
includes especially strong provisions for works of visual art. In particular, a visual artist
does not need to prove that the treatment of the work has caused damage to his or her
reputation. See Canadian Copyright Act, s. 28.2 (2); planned amendments to the Act will
not alter this framework.
26 See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis(1) ("the author shall have the right to .
. . object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.")
(emphasis added).
27 But note that this principle is violated by the UK requirement that an author must
assert the right of attribution to enjoy it under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988,
c
48,
§ 78, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl988/
UKpga 19880048_en 1.htm.
25
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"some," if not all, moral rights must be protected after the death of
the author.28 By contrast, the provisions of the Visual Artists'
Rights Act limit the duration of protection to the lifetime of the
author, and in this sense, they closely resemble personal tort
protections, which expire with the death of the affected person.29
A third possibility is case precedent. In particular, given the
limited legislative enactment of moral rights in the United States,
how is this framework supplemented or enlarged? In fact, any
reliance on common law precedent could be problematic. Given
the relative novelty of the moral rights concept in U.S. law,
American courts have had some difficulty in deciding how moral
rights can merge with existing U.S. copyright doctrines. Their
uncertainty sometimes leads to vagaries of interpretation that can
look like errors. Indeed, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling in the 2003 case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.,3 0 U.S. case precedents on moral rights seem to be
becoming more problematic with time, rather than helping to
clarify the harmonization of U.S. copyright practice with the Berne
Convention.
The Dastar case was a landmark judgment that has imposed
firm limits on the ability to develop a moral rights doctrine through
case law. In Dastar,the plaintiff argued that section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act should offer a remedy for the failure of a television
production company, Twentieth Century Fox, to attribute
authorship to the original creators of a television program about
World War II. On its face, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has
nothing to do with moral rights: it deals with false advertising. 3 1
Nevertheless, the analogy between a "false designation of origin,"
as identified by the Lanham Act, and a moral right of attribution is
See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis(2).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). But note that VARA seems to continue to recognize a
perpetual copyright at American common law in unpublished works. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(d)(2) ("Duration of Rights ... (2) With respect to works of visual art created
before the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990, but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been transferred from the
author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be coextensive with, and shall expire
at the same time as, the rights conferred by section 106.").
30
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
31 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
28

29
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a striking one. 32 Indeed, a well-known earlier case had seen this
kind of argument put forward with some success. In Gilliam v.
ABC, a severely edited version of television skits by the famed
British comedy troupe, "Monty Python," was aired in the United
States, and found to violate the comedians' moral rights. 3 3 In
effect, the court considered the edited versions of the skits to
misrepresent their origin-in other words, they did not evince the
authorship of the Monty Python troupe. According to the court,
the Lanham Act would protect artists from potential damage to
their reputations, at the very least, because of the potential
economic consequences of reputational harm. 34 As the Court
noted:
[T]he economic incentive for artistic and
intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for
See David Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 7 INT'L J.L. &
INFo. TECH. 270, 276 (1999) (emphasizing "truth-in-marketing" as one acceptable basis
for moral rights protection).
3
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It also seems
likely that appellants will succeed on the theory that, regardless of the right ABC had to
broadcast an edited program, the cuts made constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty
Python's work. This cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's
work, finds its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, which may
generally be summarized as including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to
him in the form in which he created it. American copyright law, as presently written,
does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the
law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.
Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as
the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled with the inability of
artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on
which the artists are financially dependent. Thus courts have long granted relief for
misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories outside the statutory law of
copyright, such as contract law, or the tort of unfair competition. Although such
decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly
vindicate the author's personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public
in a distorted form. Here, the appellants claim that the editing done for ABC mutilated
the original work and that consequently the broadcast of those programs as the creation of
Monty Python violated the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). This statute, the
federal counterpart to state unfair competition laws, has been invoked to prevent
misrepresentations that may injure plaintiffs business or personal reputation, even where
no registered trademark is concerned. It is sufficient to violate the Act that a
representation of a product, although technically true, creates a false impression of the
product's origin.").
32

34

See id. at 24.
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American copyright law cannot be reconciled with
the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation
or misrepresentation of their work to the public on
which the artists are financially dependent. 35
The facts in Dastar are unattractive-the case seems to
illustrate the well-known clich6 that "hard cases make bad law."
Dastar involved the re-release of a television program. The
original program was based on a memoir of World War II, written
by then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and entitled, "Crusade in
Europe." 36 The program aired in 1949, and the copyright was
registered by Twentieth Century Fox.37 The copyright was not
renewed by Fox, however, and in 1977, in keeping with U.S.
copyright practice, the program entered the public domain in the
United States.3 8 In 1995, Dastar released a video series, entitled
"Campaign in Europe," which copied substantially from the earlier
program. 39 But, in its marketing for the new program, Dastar
mentioned neither Fox nor Eisenhower's original work.4 0
In this scenario, the theory of moral rights tells us that there are
two potential claims. The first would involve attribution to the
makers of the original program. But it is crucial to note that only
the human creators of the program, and not the corporate owners of
copyright, would have had standing to sue. In the event, the
corporation responsible for commissioning the original program
sued; neither the company responsible for its creation, nor the
human authors behind it, were involved. In addition, while the
attribution rights of the author of the original book could have been
raised, these were not part of the litigation.
At trial, the claim initially succeeded on the grounds that the
program was re-released under a "false designation of origin." As
in Gilliam, the ruling was made under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, and, as Graeme W. Austin notes in his insightful commentary,
led to an award of damages for "double Dastar's profits, a decision
35
36
3
3

40

id.

Id at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id at 27.
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that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an
This decision was subsequently
unpublished opinion.' 4 1
42
overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court.
The case failed before the U.S. Supreme Court on two grounds.
First, the Court was troubled by the prospect of a multiplicity of
authors who could potentially claim to be responsible for the true
"origins" of the work, making the facts a poor fit with the Lanham
Act's provisions. 4 3 From the perspective of moral rights theory, as
well, the Court's instinctive discomfort with the uncertainty of the
work's origin makes sense-it is almost always the human creator
behind the work who sues.4 Secondly, the fact that the work in
question had fallen into the public domain presented a difficult
obstacle to the recognition of attribution rights. Under U.S.
copyright law, the public domain is supposed to be entirely
unrestricted. The Supreme Court felt that enforcing the right of
attribution in these circumstances could invalidate the American
concept of public domain. 45
The Court's intuitions on both of these issues seem wellfounded. Under moral rights theories, the plaintiffs in Dastar had
no right to claim attribution.46 Similarly, the recognition of moral
See Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral
Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 111, 118 (2005).
42
Dastar,539 U.S. 23.
43
Id. at 35 ("Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word "origin" has no
discernable limits. A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones, after its copyright has
expired, would presumably require attribution not just to MGM, but to Oscar
Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film was based), to Georges Bizet
(who wrote the opera on which the musical was based), and to Prosper Merimee (who
wrote the novel on which the opera was based). In many cases, figuring out who is in the
line of 'origin' would be no simple task.").
4
But see SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 185-86 (The one notable
exception is Japanese recognition for corporations. In this respect, Korean law follows
Japan.).
45
See Dastar,539 U.S. at 37 (Justice Scalia comments that "To hold otherwise would
be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which
Congress may not do."). But see Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 80
N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949)
(suggesting that recognizing moral rights in public domain works may make sense for
reasons of public policy).
46 But note the empowerment of corporations under Japanese, and Korean, law.
SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 185-86.
41

918

FORDHAMINTELL. PROP.MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:905

rights in the public domain implies perpetual protection for those
rights. It is certainly possible to imagine a legal regime that would
provide moral rights for works in the public domain without
establishing their protection for living authors. For example, the
tort protections offered to living authors might be sufficient to
protect name and reputation. Nevertheless, the idea of recognizing
moral rights exclusively in public domain works seems
unnatural-at least in the sense that it appears never to have been
tried. Even to fulfill a special policy goal, perpetual recognition
for moral rights in the public domain seems like a huge step
forward for a country that has yet to recognize moral rights in the
works of living authors. 47
Subsequent interpretation of the Dastar case may have
extended the application of the ruling beyond what the Supreme
Court intended. The facts of Dastar turned on the issue of public
domain; yet the ruling has been enlarged to apply to works still
within the term of copyright protection in the United States. The
distinction between works within copyright and works in the
public domain is important everywhere, but this boundary seems to
be marked with special clarity in the United States. It is therefore
questionable to claim that Dastar establishes a principle for both.4 8
Dastar is also presumed to stand for an idea that is
controversial in a different sense. The case identifies the difficulty
of locating a proper "origin" for a work as a practical problem.
But subsequent interpretation of the Dastar ruling seems to see this
difficulty as insurmountable.4 9 On this view, Dastar would
invalidate all claims for moral rights protection under the Lanham
Act provisions on false designations of origin. Accordingly, there
could be no recourse to the Lanham Act to vindicate a claim for
the moral right of attribution.
In fact, this very idea was examined in the case of Shostakovich. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). The judge in the Shostakovich case was willing to consider the
possibility of moral rights protection in the public domain, because of the role that moral
rights could play in protecting cultural heritage. Ultimately, he ruled against the idea
because of the ambiguities inherent in the concept, which had no precedent in U.S. law,
and offered a number of practical difficulties such as which rights to protect and what
kind of evidentiary basis would support their protection. Id.
48
See Austin, supra note 41, at 148 (Austin's insightful comments on this issue).
49 See Austin, supra note 41, at 113, 121.
47

2011]

CREATIVE COMMONS

919

After Dastar, the reality appears to be one of strict separation
among the different parts of the United States legal system dealing
with moral rights. The protections of VARA, the Lanham Act,
state legislation on moral rights, and common-law torts are parallel
lines that run alongside one another, and will never meet.
Moreover, there appears to be no overlap among the different legal
regimes-not because any overlap is expressly prohibited by
statute, but because judicial interpretation chooses to limit the
availability of protection in this way. Eligibility for protection
under one part of the U.S. legal regime implies limitations on the
availability of protections under every other part. In itself, the
approach is sound; it promotes a coherent and efficient approach to
the law. However, in a situation where precedents on moral rights
are not reconciled by any overarching doctrine, the rule eliminates
possibilities for recognizing moral rights in U.S. law without
allowing any alternative means for their protection. Moral rights
are not comprehensively protected in general, or even special,
legislation; and the doctrine of moral rights is not recognized by
the courts.
The United States therefore finds itself in an incongruous
position. On the one hand, it has assumed an unprecedented
leadership role in international copyright matters. In particular, the
United States is promoting, in active and aggressive terms, and on
a global scale, the practical importance of enforcing copyright
standards. On the other hand, in relation to the protection of moral
rights, the United States lags behind other countries. There is
neither legislative recognition nor practical enforcement of moral
rights to any significant degree. Legislative reform surrounding
moral rights is at a stalemate; and current case law, with particular
reference to the influential Dastar ruling, suggests that options for
protecting moral rights at American common law are narrowing.
But the moral rights concept is not entirely absent from the
American copyright scene. Rather, moral rights have resurfaced in
a most unexpected place: the "copyleft" movement, which seeks to
make works of authorship freely available to the public without the
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restrictions of copyright law.50 Copyleft, particularly in its
incarnation as Professor Lawrence Lessig's Creative Commons
movement, rejects the idea of copyright permissions and,
accordingly, copyright royalties. However, it recognizes the moral
rights of attribution and integrity. Indeed, the moral rights
approach to creative works is the foundation of the Creative
Commons license, by means of which a work is effectively
released to the public. This form of publication ensures that the
work is available for use without copyright restrictions, but it is not
without conditions: attribution and integrity are protected, to
varying degrees, and in various guises, as authors decide. 5 ' The
provisions of the Creative Commons licenses closely approximate
the legislative provisions of moral rights to be found in the laws of
countries outside the United States.
Is the Creative Commons approach to moral rights universally
accepted by open access movements? In fact, this Article
compares the recognition of authors' "moral" interests, both actual
and potential, across four types of open access movements:
Creative Commons; open source software; projects for the
collective creation of works via the Internet, such as Wikipedia;
and the creation of Internet libraries, including the Google Books
project. The analysis will consider three questions. First, how
significant is the recognition of authors' moral interests in model
agreements for open access licensing? Can it truly be considered a
form of recognition for moral rights as they are traditionally known
in European civil law and developing countries? Secondly, what is
the rationale behind the presence of moral rights in open access
licenses? In particular, what are the philosophical reasons, as well
as the legal explanations, for their presence? Thirdly, what are the
alternatives for recognizing moral rights in alternative open-access
scenarios, specifically those presented by collaborative creation
along Wikipedia lines, and digital archives such as Google Books?

But note the double connotation of the word "free," which means both free in the
sense of the enjoyment of liberty, and free in the sense that something is available gratis,
free of cost. See discussion infra Part II.A.5.
51 See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses
(last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
5o
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The purpose of the analysis is to explore the more general
problem of how to recognize moral rights in the context of
American law. Legislation and case law largely appear to have
failed. Can the treatment of moral rights in open access
movements help to bring protection to moral rights in the United
States? In particular, can it provide a basis for achieving new
legislative or judicial compromises on moral rights in the U.S.
copyright system at large? Or, do open access movements offer a
viable alternative to legal and judicial protection of American
moral rights?
II. OPEN ACCESS: FRIENDS OR STRANGERS?

There is a great variety of open access movements in the
United States and throughout the world. As a starting point, this
discussion examines the place of moral rights in two prototypical,
and related, open access movements: Creative Commons and Free
Software.
A. Creative Commons: Implicit Recognition of Moral Rights
In the usual scenario, acquiring the right to use a copyrightprotected work involves two steps. First, one must obtain
permission to use the work; and secondly, one is generally obliged
to pay a fee for that use. Both factors can particularly inhibit the
creative re-use of a work-citation or allusion in a new work, for
example. While certain attempts to re-use a work may fall within
the definition of "fair use" or "fair dealing," there is no bright line
conveniently separating a fair use from an infringement of
copyright. Rough guidelines are sometimes provided-in Canada,
photocopying a book is restricted to 20% of the total content52_
See, e.g., the useful website of the College of New Caledonia on copyright at
http://www.cnc.bc.ca/Exploring/Services/Library/infosheets/copyright.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011). Similar information is provided by most Canadian universities. Much
copyright in the educational context is regulated through Access Copyright, an
organization whose approach to copyright is increasingly facing criticism as excessive
52

and detrimental to education. See, e.g., Rory McGreal, New Copyright Fee Will See
Students Pay More for Learning Materials, EDMONTON J. (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://auspace.athabascau.ca:8080/dspace/handle/2149/2681 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
The same guidelines of showing 20% are observed by Google Books when it provides
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but copyright infringement is classically about the "quality" of
copying, as much as the quantity.53 In the case of works whose
copyright owners are impossible to locate, often known as
"orphan" works, the new use of the work, in its turn, may have to
be abandoned. 54
The objective of the Creative Commons movement is to
circumvent this system entirely. Creative Commons aims to
promote the dissemination of works without the restrictions of
copyright law. It provides an alternative to copyright protection by
proposing that authors release their works under the terms of a
license to the general public. The exact terms of the license vary
according to a number of possible models provided by Creative
Commons, and examples may be seen on the Creative Commons
website.
All Creative Commons licenses aim at the common goal of
allowing any person to use a work without requiring the
permission of the copyright owner, or the payment of royalties. 5 6
snippets of copyright-protected books for users to browse their content. See Google Book
Settlement, GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH SETTLEMENT, http://www.googlebooksettlement.com
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). The fact that the snippets are machine-generated could
potentially pose a problem for moral rights, as they might misrepresent a work. See Mira
T. Sundara Rajan, Google Books Settlement and Moral Rights: What Role Have They
Played? What Role Should They Play?, Presentation given to the Eighteenth Annual
Fordham Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference (April 8-9, 2010).
See, e.g., CyberMedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) ("even if a copied portion be relatively small in proportion to the entire work,
if qualitatively important, the finder of fact may properly find substantial similarity."
(quoting Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987)); Ladbroke (Football)
Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 at 471 (Can.).
54
some cases, arrangements can be made to use an orphan work if the user has
made an attempt "in good faith" to locate the owner of the copyright. In Canada, the
Copyright Board has issued a number of licenses to use orphan works. On June 4, 2008,
the EU released a Memorandum of Understanding on the issue. See Memorandum of
Understanding on Diligent Search Guidelines for Orphan Works, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/activities/digital libraries/doc/hleg/orphan/mou.p
df (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
5s See CREATIVE COMMONS, About The Licenses, www.creativecommons.org/licenses
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
56 Id. It is worth noting that the licenses make provision for the payment of royalties
only where a commercial use is made of the work. The purpose of this provision is to
prohibit someone from making a commercial use of the work: a purpose which is
fundamentally different from providing for an economic return to the author. The
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However, the Creative Commons use of a work is not entirely free
of conditions, and a closer examination of these reveals the
presence of the author in a new and interesting form.
1. Copyright Infringement and Creative Commons: License or
Contract?
The general license to the public generated by Creative
Commons operates very much like a contract between parties,
which can override the terms of copyright law. For example,
copyright law might state that, in a "work-for-hire" or employment
relationship, the initial copyright in the work is owned by the
employer.5 7 But an individual's contract of employment may
provide that he retains copyright in his own work, and this
contractual arrangement will prevail over the copyright law. In the
case of the Creative Commons licenses, should the new user of the
work fail to respect the conditions of use specified in the license to
the general public, he will become liable for infringing the
provision does not really have anything to do with economic rights at all, but is perhaps
better described as a matter of ideology-making sure that anyone who uses the work
adheres to the principle of non-commercial use which is at the heart of Creative
Commons, i.e., "I give my work to you, provided that you don't try to make money out of
it." To give a concrete example, it would not be possible for an author to use a
photograph from Wikimedia commons in a book published by a commercial publisher,
because the author would expect to receive royalties out of the book. But, nothing about
this arrangement implies that the photographer will make money out of his or her own
work. The photographer may or may not be interested in making money out of it; but he
or she wants to make certain that someone else will not do so. This could be considered
an "economic aspect" to the attribution right. It is important to remember that copyright
law continues to operate in the background. Anyone who has licensed a work under a
Creative Commons license can also use the work as a regular work, at least in theory.
The photographer should be able to release his or her work under Creative Commons and
also include it in his or her own book, which might earn royalties. But this arrangement
is governed by copyright law and operates alongside the Creative Commons license. In
the case of someone else attempting to make a commercial use of the photo, any one of
the Creative Commons licenses is potentially enforceable, not only under contract law,
but by the author choosing to claim copyright infringement.
57 See Canadian Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, available at
http://laws.justice.gc.calen/C-42/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [Canadian
Copyright Act], sec. 13.3, Work Made in the Course of Employment ("Where the author
of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or
apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person,
the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to
the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright. . . .") (emphasis added).
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copyright in the original work. Copyright litigation is a way of
enforcing the Creative Commons license. While the terms of the
license are respected, the copyright owner cannot bring an action
for infringement. Once an improper use of the work is made-a
use not allowed under the terms of the license-the license is
invalidated, and copyright infringement can be invoked by the
author of the original work.
The relationship between Creative Commons licenses and
contracts receives an important treatment in the 2008 case of
Jacobsen v. Katzer.59 The court interprets the terms of the license
as equivalent to the "conditions" of a contract, and, therefore,
binding upon those who make use of the work. Judge Jeffrey S.
White explains: "Thus, if the terms of the Artistic License
allegedly violated are both covenants and conditions, they may
serve to limit the scope of the license and are governed by
copyright law. If they are merely covenants, by contrast, they are
governed by contract law." 60
The court goes on to offer a detailed analysis of the Creative
Commons framework for software, explaining how the economic
and moral elements of the license work together to accomplish
important practical goals:

See About The Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONs, http://creativecommons.org/licenses
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
" 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), remanded,609 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
60 Id at 1380. The case was settled on Feb. 19, 2010, and drew the comment: "Th[e] .
. . terms [of the settlement] can include an affirmative obligation of a commercial
developer to 'give back' its own changes to the code for the benefit of others. They
invariably also include an obligation to acknowledge the authorship of those that had
created the earlier code." See Andy Updegrove, A Big Victory for F/OSS: Jacobsen v.
Katzer
is
Settled, CONSORTIUMINFO,
(Feb.
19,
2010,
9:45
AM),
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=201002190850472;
see
also Ashley West, Little Victories: PromotingArtistic ProgressThrough the Enforcement
of Creative Commons Attribution and Share-Alike Licenses, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 903,
913 (2009) ("After the Federal Circuit released the Jacobsen opinion, the technology
blogosphere praised the decision, announcing that the judicial system had finally given a
definitive answer that public licensing regimes are enforceable as a matter of law. Part of
this enthusiasm likely stemmed from the simple fact that Jacobsen was the first case to
specifically discuss the Creative Commons movement in a significant way.") (intemal
citations omitted).
58
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The clear language of the Artistic License creates
conditions to protect the economic rights at issue in
the granting of a public license. These conditions
govern the rights to modify and distribute the
computer programs and files included in the
downloadable software package. The attribution
and modification transparency requirements directly
serve to drive traffic to the open source incubation
page and to inform downstream users of the project,
which is a significant economic goal of the
copyright holder that the law will enforce. Through
this controlled spread of information, the copyright
holder gains creative collaborators to the open
source project; by requiring that changes made by
downstream users be visible to the copyright holder
and others, the copyright holder learns about the
uses for his software and gains others-knowledge
that can be used to advance future software

releases.61
2. The Basic License: Attribution Affirmed
According to the terms of a Creative Commons license, a
person wanting to use a work released under the license must meet
one fundamental condition: the new user must credit the creator of
the original work in his new creation.62 The Creative Commons
attribution license does not cancel the copyright in the original
work, which remains as an underlying right of the author. Instead,
the license suspends the operation of copyright.6 3
Under the Attribution license, if someone were to use the work
without attributing it to the original creator, the user could be sued
Copyright becomes a fall-back
for copyright infringement.

Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382.
See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/1icenses
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Note that every license available through Creative Commons
requires, at a minimum, attribution to the author. Id.
63 See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
2011).
visited
Apr.
28,
(last
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ
61
62
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position-it serves, implicitly, to enforce the terms of the Creative
Commons license.
A closer look at the attribution license reveals something
interesting: the license represents a total rejection of copyright
restrictions. Any use can be made of a work released under this
license, including commercial uses. So, for example, a photograph
released under the attribution license could be used in a
commercially released documentary or feature film. But the profit
from the film would go exclusively to its producers; the person
making the photograph would have no claim on any earnings from
the project. This would be the case regardless of how significant
the image was-even if it were central to the successful marketing
of the film, for example, appearing on publicity posters. But the
condition of attribution remains, and attribution must be done
according to the terms required by the original author.
Attribution is the foundation of moral rights, and as such, the
attribution license could be called a "moral rights" license for the
use of the work. It is a license that protects the author's right of
attribution without imposing any financial obligations on the user,
or providing in any way for economic rewards to the author. The
attribution license does leave open the question of integrity, but the
explanation of the license by Creative Commons states that "the
author's moral rights" are "[i]n no way ... affected by the
license."64 In other words, and with particular reference to
countries where the author enjoys moral rights under the copyright
statute, the attribution license explicitly operates in addition to the
existing legal framework for the protection of authors' moral
rights. If the copyright law of a country offers extensive protection
for moral rights, the attribution license is merely reinforcing the
law. But, in the case of a country where moral rights are not wellprotected, the Creative Commons license may offer moral rights
protection that is not otherwise available in this form-for
example, in the United States.
This situation presents a contrast to the author's economic
entitlement under copyright law, which he effectively "contracts
See Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States (CC BY-SA 3.0), CREATIVE
COMMoNs, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/us (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
6
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out of' by the attribution license. By allowing individuals to use
the work, provided that they attribute it to the author, the author
agrees to forego his or her royalties, as normally provided for by
copyright legislation. If, however, the work is not attributed to the
author, or if it is used in some other way that contravenes the
attribution license, the author has a cause of action against the user.
This cause of action exists, both under the terms of the license and,
potentially, under the regular provisions of copyright law for
infringement of the author's copyright.
3. The Creation of Derivative Works: Integrity or Attribution?
Creative Commons licenses build upon each other in
consecutive steps, each group more restrictive than the last. Based
on the attribution concept, the second level of license provides,
first, for a "share alike" principle: should an author create a new
work out of his creative re-use of an existing work, he will be
required to release it under the same type of Creative Commons
license as the original work. At the same level, a second,
"attribution noncommercial" license prevents anyone re-using the
work from doing so for commercial purposes. 6 5 This license is
noteworthy because of its considerable restrictiveness: any
subsequent use of the work which leads to commercial gain,
whether intentionally or accidentally would invalidate the license,
potentially exposing the user of the work to copyright liability.
From the perspective of moral rights, the third license, which
adds a "no derivatives" principle to the attribution license, is
noteworthy. It provides that no person should make a derivative
work based on the original work; as the Creative Commons group
explains, "This license allows for redistribution, commercial and
non-commercial, as long as it is passed along unchanged and in
whole, with credit to you." 66
At the next level, two types of licenses can be found. The first
combines attribution with the principles of noncommercial use and

65

Attribution-NonCommercial3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS,

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
66

About
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licenses (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
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the need to "share alike"-to allow the use of the new work only
on the same terms as the original work.67 Secondly, a more
restrictive version of the "no derivatives" license includes this rule
alongside noncommercial use.68 This license is said to provide
"free advertising" for the creator of the original work, as it allows
the work to circulate freely, provided that attribution of the author
is maintained, and the work itself is not altered.
The principle of restricting the creation of derivative works
includes within it the integrity right, which would prohibit
alterations to the original work. But the no-derivatives principle is
both larger and more general than the integrity right. It completely
prohibits the making of derivative works, even where the
derivative creation might not violate the integrity of the original
work. At the same time, it cannot protect a work from intervention
that will not result in the outright creation of a new, ostensibly
"derivative," work. Only in special cases, where the alteration of
the work is so egregious as, in effect, to create a new work-the
Monty Python scenario -WOuld the integrity right and the nonderivation principle be truly equivalent.
As in the case of the attribution right, any statutory moral rights
apparently continue to exist alongside the no-derivatives principle.
Once again, given the international use of Creative Commons
licenses, the persistence of statutory moral rights is important.
Even if the user of the work did something that amounted to
something less than the creation of a derivative work, but altered
the original work-for example, shared a piece of music from
which one of the stanzas of a song had been removed-this could
certainly qualify as a violation of the moral right of integrity.
According to the moral rights doctrine, the distortion of the
original work would be sufficient to violate the integrity right; but
the change may or may not be sufficiently substantial to lead to the
creation of a new, derivative work. A derivative work might
Attribution-NonCommercial3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
68 Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivs 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-ND
3.0),
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0 (last visited Apr.
28, 2011).
69
Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
67
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require further changes-the removal of a stanza and changes to
the wording of another stanza, for example. This situation could
not be remedied under usual copyright principles.
The close relationship between derivative works and the
integrity principle is important in American law, and there is every
reason to interpret Creative Commons licenses against the
background of this legal culture. However, the "no derivatives"
idea that appears in Creative Commons is a distorted reflection of
the moral right of integrity. In fact, the real clue to the significance
of the restriction on making derivative works lies in the
consideration that derivative works must traditionally be
authorized by the copyright-holder. Under the Creative Commons
approach, the "no derivatives" idea is not just a species of integrity
right: it can also be seen as a manifestation of the attribution right.
Its purpose is to allow the author to control what is done with his
work.
This realization affirms the conclusion that reputation is the
true heart of the Creative Commons system. In the Digital Age,
the growth of reputations can be promoted exponentially by the
freedom to communicate information. The practice of new popular
music groups posting videos of themselves on YouTube to create a
reputation, quite literally out of thin air, is just one example of how
technology works to promote reputations. The emphasis on
disseminating information through Creative Commons makes
sense in the light of a broader preoccupation with reputation.
Ironically, copyright can actually interfere with the growth of a
reputation, by impeding, and possibly preventing, the
dissemination of works through new technologies-a fact that the
founders of Creative Commons have thoroughly understood.
4. Reputation: The Heart of Open Access
The presence of attribution and "no-derivatives" requirements
in the Creative Commons model amounts to a form of recognition
for moral rights. The attribution principle occupies a central role
in Creative Commons licenses. As for the principle of "noderivatives," it could be considered an extremely broad form of the
integrity right, but it should also be recognized as a manifestation
of the attribution principle. In addition, Creative Commons
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licenses specifically allow moral rights, as defined by law, to
coexist with the terms of the licenses.70 This stands in stark
contrast to the author's economic rights at law, from which he
essentially chooses to "opt out" by releasing his work under the
license.
Why does Creative Commons build its licensing system around
these moral rights principles? It is apparent that, at some level, and
in spite of its populist rhetoric,n Creative Commons is preoccupied
with authorship. An overall consideration of the components of
Creative Commons licenses suggests that, seen in context, the
requirement of attribution, like the "share alike" and "noderivatives" principles, aims to promote the individuals behind the
creation of works. In particular, all three principles accomplish the
same goal: they affirm the author's right to control his or her own
work.
The formulation of the attribution right in the Creative
Commons attribution license offers an interesting illustration of
this principle. Not only is the author's attribution protected, but
the author also chooses the method by which he wants to be
attributed. No moral rights statute in the world appears to provide
for the author to control the method of attribution, yet it is a basic
right recognized by Creative Commons.
But the type of author imagined by Creative Commons is a
specific kind of individual. Entrepreneurial and tech-savvy, the
Creative Commons author is, above all, an amateur.
Notwithstanding Lessig's idealistic definition of "free," embracing
the goal of "Free Culture" in practice means forfeiting the
opportunity to be paid for one's work. None of the Creative
Commons licenses provide for payment for the uses of a work.
See, e.g., Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0), CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
7'
Culture, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/culture (last visited Apr.
28, 2011) ("Our goal at Creative Commons is to increase cultural creativity in "the
commons"-the body of work freely available to the public for legal use, sharing,
repurposing, and remixing. We realize there's an inherent conflict between innovative
digital culture and archaic copyright laws. Our licenses help bridge that conflict so that
the Internet can reach its full potential. . . . Creative Commons is about building
infrastructure for a new kind of culture-one that is both a folk culture, and wildly more
sophisticated than anything before it.").
70
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Reputation is everything; money is nothing. Creative Commons
cannot, therefore, be a comprehensive solution to the problems of
excessive copyright control. It is a solution for those who do not
need, or do not want, to earn money for their creative work.
What happens to creative life in a world where the choice lies
between corporate control of culture and the free distribution of
works? The obvious answer is academia. It is the ideal Creative
Commons career. The author earns a salary, independent of
earnings from publications or other public manifestations of his or
her work, and thereby enjoys the luxury of being able to afford to
distribute work to the public free of charge.
5. The Dark Side of Open Access: Art as a Profession in
Decline
What happens when intellectuals and artists cannot expect to
be paid for their work? Given the multiple connotations of "free"
access to culture, this question deserves a closer look. In fact, two
consequences follow. First, artists will, of course, cease to be
professionals. Being unable to earn a living from creative work
means that one must earn one's living by some other means. The
lucky ones might come from independently wealthy families. For
others, the ubiquitous "day job" can guarantee a double life to look
forward to-the tension of a lifetime spent in struggle to find the
time to do what one wants to do, and, perhaps, what one does best.
But making intellectual creation "free" does something even
larger: it negates society's principal method of recognizing value.
Money is the means by which society acknowledges value,
whether that value arises in things, labor, or information. No
doubt, it is a flawed system for assigning value. How flawed is it?
The classic example of how money valuation is misdirected in
the cultural arena is to point out that a work of mass culture will
generate more money than a work of art. But, in fact, it is
probably more accurate to say that the life-cycles of these two
kinds of works are different. A popular work generates its returns
in the initial period of its publication, but a work of art generates
its revenues over the long term.
As Ernest Hemingway
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commented, "good books always make money eventually."7 2 Van
Gogh's paintings were worthless during his lifetime, but are now
among the top five most expensive paintings ever sold.73 F. Scott
Fitzgerald's novel, The Great Gatsby, did not sell out its original
print run; 74 it is now considered one of the greatest works in
English of the twentieth century and is currently in print in new
editions. The fact remains: money is the principal method by
which society recognizes value. It is not the only one, and, when it
comes to culture, there are other ways of showing appreciationfor example, creating a new work, in homage or in parody, or
helping to publicize work that deserves an audience. But it is not
clear that any alternative can provide a totally adequate substitute
for money. To remove money valuation altogether from creative
works is to create an instant bias against the recognition of their
value by society.
And why should the person who is capable of intellectual
creation be deprived of money because he happens to have the
misfortune of an intellectual gift in lieu of business capital?
George Bernard Shaw claimed that a true artist could never be
happy doing anything for a living but creating.7 5 However,
throughout most of human history, this is exactly what artists have
had to do. Turning the clock backwards, and finding ourselves in
any European capital some two hundred years ago, we can witness
this story playing itself out in the lives of artists who have since
become famous-musicians like Mozart and Beethoven, writers
like Jane Austen or Voltaire. Schubert was famously torn between

ERNEST HEMINGWAY, GREEN HILLS OF AFRICA 24 (Scribner 2002) (1935).
7
Robert W. Johnson, The 17 Most Expensive PaintingsEver Sold, Bus. INSIDER, Mar.
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-paitings-ever-sold-201125, 2011,
3?op=l.
74 Arthur Mizener, Gatsby, 35 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1960,
http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/12/24/specials/fitzgerald-gatsby6O.html.
72

75

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN (1903), he writes: "The true artist

will let his wife starve, his children go barefoot, his mother drudge for a living at seventy,
sooner than work at anything but his art." The play is available online, through Project
Gutenberg at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3328/3328-h/3328-h.htm (last visited Apr.
28,2011).
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his living as a schoolteacher and his work as a composer. 6
Society can take some comfort in the psychological theory that
inner conflict such as his produces great art. But how does that
justify painful living conditions?
Indeed, prior to the Romantic era, the means of sustenance for
artists were few. Those who were successful sometimes came
from aristocratic families; more often, their talents won favor for
them from a wealthy patron, a king or a duke who was willing to
support them, if only for a time. Independence was a luxury that
few artists could afford.
Patronage provided a poor infrastructure for intellectual life.7 7
With the expansion of mass culture in the nineteenth century,
many intellectuals were understandably eager to entrust themselves
to the public for their livelihood.7 8 Experiences could be bitterFriedrich Schiller's faith in the public led to disappointment and
bankruptcy 79 -- but the alternatives were equally unsatisfactory in
their own ways.
Looking further afield, in both space and time, we can consider
the history of India. The birthplace of a number of the world's
great intellectual and artistic traditions, Indian culture developed a
highly formal relationship between intellectual and material
wealth. Intellectuals and artists earned a livelihood from their
Amanda Roggero, Retracing the Journey of Franz Schubert's Wanderer: Musical
Fingerprints in the B-Flat Piano Sonata, D.960 (May 26, 2004) (unpublished A.Mus.D
dissertation, University of Cincinnati).
n Paula J. Bishop, The Patronage of Composers in the United States (2005)
(unpublished M.Mus thesis, Boston University).
78 In India, the experience was felt into the twentieth century: Tamil Renaissance poet,
Subramaniya Bharathi, satirized his experiences at the court of the Ettayapuram Maharaja
(and the Majaraja himself), in the delightful short novel, Chinna Sankaran Kadhai (The
Story of Little Shankaran). The work is pending availability in English translation (S.
Vijaya Bharati & Mira T. Sundara Rajan), though it is occasionally referenced in other
works. See, e.g., A.R. VENKATACHALAPATHY, IN THOSE DAYS, THERE WAS NO COFFEE:
WRITINGS IN CULTURAL HISTORY 167 (2006) (discussing the growth of biographical
fiction in South Indian literature). Coffee-drinking, as immortalized in R.K. Narayan's
humorous tales, is the endemic social passion of South Indians. See R.K. Narayan, Coffee
76

Worries, in A WRITER'S NIGHTMARE: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1958-1988 (1988).
79
See CALVIN THOMAS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF FRIEDRICH SCHILLER 153 (1901)
(describing the experience as Schiller's attempt to live as a "literary free-lance who

served no prince, but only the public").
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work, but they did so by largely indirect means. Tradition
compelled the wealthy and worldly castes to provide financially
for their educators and learned men and women.
By separating intellectual work from money, Creative
Commons is therefore not proposing anything truly new.
However, without providing an alternate system for the support of
creative individuals, the movement leaves unanswered the
fundamental question of how society intends to support the
creation of culture. If the marketplace will not support artists, who
(or what) will?8 0 Is it time for a new system of patronage, perhaps
in the form of state support? After all, if society can go so far as to
claim "co-authorship" of creative works, as at least one
commentator has suggested, does society not have a corresponding
obligation to provide financial support?8 ' And if so, should the
support not be generous, to free an artist for intellectual life, in
every sense, from all extraneous demands? In the absence of
market opportunities to sell his work, what would be the use of a
pension that allows an artist less than what he needs to survive,

8
I am indebted to Ben Arrow for pointing out that this question has animated
American intellectual property jurisprudence since the era of the founders. In particular,
it was clearly recognized that a limited monopoly could help to promote scientific
innovation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out that Thomas Jefferson, who, "like other
Americans [of the founding generation], had an instinctive aversion to monopolies,"
famously endorsed a limited monopoly to encourage innovation in science and the arts.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (citing Letter to Oliver Evans (May
1807), V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed.)). Notably, Jefferson
"rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the
social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly was not
designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." Id. The parallel with copyright
law is interesting, in the sense that American copyright law had already weighed and
rejected a Creative Commons-type approach to scientific innovation more than two
hundred years before the advent of the copyleft movement. Notwithstanding these
comments, the fundamental differences between scientific innovation and artistic
creativity should be duly noted. In particular, these two types of activities occur in very
different environments, and, in some ways, it may be easier to grasp artists' rights as a
form of individual rights.
81 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward "ForLimited Times," 88 B.U.
L. REV. 685, 696-702 (2008) (reviewing LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN
COPYRIGHT (2007)).

2011]

CREATIVE COMMONS

935

and, in this new scenario where works would be available free of
charge, would deprive him of any chance at financial stability?
The question of artistic livelihood leads to another, troubling
consideration: how can an artist or intellectual build material
stability for himself if society prevents him from doing so? In
contrast to a person who is able to amass material property, the
profit from an artist's creation is taken away from him by society,
apparently for the general benefit. No one takes away the property
of a landowner, or the assets of a businessman. In the worst case it
is taxed, but the bulk of it remains, supporting the entrepreneur
throughout his life and, for some period afterwards, his
descendants. This is not considered to be detrimental to society.
Rather, the accumulation of capital is seen as a positive
achievement in most modem democracies-one that benefits
society by "creating wealth" and "creating jobs."
On the other hand, the value that could be generated out of an
artist's work does not evoke a comparable attitude of respect. Art,
it is said, belongs to society; sooner or later, it enters the public
domain. Yet the effect of rendering artists' works into the public
domain means that they are deprived of their own livelihood, their
own "assets." And, certainly, they have no chance of leaving
anything for their families in the form of an inheritance. An
artist's family is condemned to eternal poverty-unless at least
Each
some of his descendants learn how to do other things.
the
build
on
cannot
and
generation has to begin over again
achievements of its ancestor-those are deemed to be public
property, but the heirs of businessman are generally considered to
be "entitled" to their wealth and the social advantages that it
secures.
It is easy to forget that a person with intellectual capabilities
may have nothing else of equal value to contribute to society. Yet
society considers itself the rightful owner, and the rightful
beneficiary, of what he or she creates. What is the fundamental
Pierre Hugo, a great-great-grandson of Victor Hugo, who brought suit against
Francois Crdsa for his sequels to Les Misdrables, is apparently a goldsmith by trade. See
Kim Willsher, Heir of Victor Hugo Fails to Stop Les Mis II-France'sHighest Appeal
Court Allows Modern Sequel to 1860s Masterpiece, GUARDIAN, Jan. 30, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/31/books.france.
82
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difference between property and creative work? The capacity to
exclude-society can take away the product of an artist's mind, so
it does. It cannot do the same to an entrepreneur, a businessman
who makes money. It is difficult to remove property, to confiscate
money without the owner's consent. And if conflicts escalate, the
owner has the resources to compel the law to his side-to launch
suits, to propagate his point of view through the use of his material
resources, to advertise and generate publicity on his side. An
artist, who lacks material resources, cannot command the same
things from society. This is the dark side of "open access"-the
dispossession of human beings.
B. Free Software: A PracticalNeedfor Moral Rights
The history of copyright law is a curiously poetic one. Poetry
lies in the means, if not in the end: copyright is built on the
development of analogies.83 Each form of copyright protection is
accepted because it is somehow akin to previously known formsfilm grows out of photographs, music, like literature, is also a form
of written expression. 84 The protection of computer software,
widely debated in its early history, was no exception to this rule.
Software eventually became subsumed under one of copyright's
metaphors-after all, computer programs are written forms of
intellectual expression, "like" literary works.
But there is nothing inevitable about copyright protection for
software. Through the early 1990s, a number of alternative
approaches to software were debated.
Software might be
The history of copyright readily invokes the idea of a "deep structure," which is
embedded in the narrative structures of the law.
84 Canadian history on this issue is instructive. A 1968 case found
that a musical
broadcast did not infringe copyright because the true copyright work was not the music,
but was the written score of the music. Canada's copyright law was subsequently
amended to include a definition of music that accepted both the written score and the
music itself as subject to copyright protection. See CAPAC v. CTV Television Network,
[1968] S.C.R. 676 (Can.), available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.calen/1968/1968scr0676/1968scr0-676.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
85 In fact, Colin Tapper points out that "the argument about whether copyright or
patent was most appropriate for software was at its height in the 1960s." He observes
that "the debate was closer then because it pre-dated the personal computer, and the
software in issue was system software (normally in machine code)." E-mail to author
(July 14, 2010) (on file with author).
83
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patentable as a scientific invention, or it might be entitled to a new
form of protection, a system of sui generis rights, reflecting its
own novelty. An important possibility remained the option of no
"protection" at all-free and unrestricted access to software.
When copyright won out, it represented a victory for major players
in this burgeoning industry, such as Microsoft, who would enjoy
the benefits of automatic and extended protection for their works.
Established software designers stood to benefit; for new companies
and would-be innovators, copyright protection introduced new
restrictiveness to what had previously been an open playing field.
When copyright protection for software was accepted, it seems
natural that alternative regimes for rights in software should have
died a natural death. In fact, this did not happen, and their
persistence probably reflects the dissatisfaction generated by a
premature attempt to resolve the software conundrum. Alternative
approaches to the recognition of software as a new form of
intellectual creation remain. If anything, they have gained strength
with the passage of time. They coexist alongside copyright
protection, raising interesting problems about the nature and extent
of intellectual rights in software and the consequences of
restricting growth in this crucially important field.
Alternatives to copyright protection share the common
intuition of a poor fit between software as a new form of
intellectual creation, and the conventional precepts of copyright
law. Patents in software respond to this concern by introducing
protection that is both more specialized and more limited. They
can protect the specific aspects of software associated with the
functions of programs, without crippling further development.87 In
contrast, copyright could impose large-scale protection on
computer programs, restricting features that should be generally

86

But see Jane C. Ginsburg, FourReasons anda Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of

Copyright over Sui Generis Protectionof Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2559

(1994); Ginsburg is skeptical about the possibility.
87 In addition, Colin Tapper notes that "the main advantage of patent as a means of
protecting software is that it allows the idea (or aim) of the software to be protected given
that software is so versatile that the same effects can be created by any number of
different sequences of instructions in any number of different software systems." E-mail
to author (July 14, 2010) (on file with author).
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available for the development of the technology. In the landmark
ruling of State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., an American court found that software could be
patented as a "business model" under U.S. law, unleashing a spate
of new precedents granting patents in software.88 At the same
time, patent protection is subject to the rigors of registration8 9 and
review9o before it can be granted, and the duration of protection
never exceeds twenty years, 91 as compared to copyright's
minimum of seventy. 92
However, the possibility of patent protection for software has
met with an interesting obstacle: the formalization of copyright
protection for software in international regulation. In particular,
the TRIPs Agreement provides that computer programs must be
recognized as copyright works by the member countries of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). 9 3 In an important phrase,
TRIPs specifies that they should be protected "as literary works." 94
No distinction is made between computer programs and other
types of literary works. The implication is that any and all rights
enjoyed by literary works will be available for computer programs,
as well. In most of the member countries of the WTO, with the
notable exception of the United States, this implies that the moral
rights of authors must be recognized in computer programs, as in
all other literary works.
In terms of patent rights, the significance of this provision is
immense. If computer programs must be protected as literary
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010).
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
'
35 U.S.C. § I11.
90
91
35 U.S.C. § 154(2).
92 Copyright term for software in the United States is currently seventy years from the
date of making. 17 U.S.C. § 302. The term of copyright protection was extended in 2002,
and a constitutional challenge, arguing that the extended term contravened the limits on
copyright in the U.S. Constitution, failed in 2003. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372
(3d Cir. 2001), aff'd, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. ("The
Congress shall have power ... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.").
9
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10.1.
94
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6.
8
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works under copyright law, how can software patents be
recognized? Will they exist as an additional form of protection for
There is no
a program, alongside copyright in the work?
against the
theory
or
law
property
prohibition in intellectual
coexistence of different types of intellectual property rights in a
single work; but this option always raises the possibility of
excessive protection for a given type of intellectual creation. 95
Indeed, concerns about excessive restrictions on software led to the
rejection, in 2005, of a proposal for the recognition of software
patents in the European Union. 9 6
The open access alternative is in direct opposition to
intellectual property rights in software, and its continued
importance reflects the unresolved controversy surrounding the
copyright model of protection. But open access movements in
software share something interesting with copyright: a moral
dimension. to their views. In the case of software, the moral
argument can mean two things. The first is a moral perspective in
the largest sense of the term: many proponents of open access
believe that it is morally wrong to restrict access to a technology of
such importance to society. Richard Stallman, the founder of the
Free Software Foundation, is the leading advocate for the moral
imperative of access to software. His comments on the different
connotations of copyright for books and software are instructive:
The copyright system was created expressly for the
purpose of encouraging authorship. In the domain
for which it was invented-books, which could be
copied economically only on a printing press-it
did little harm, and did not obstruct most of the
individuals who read the books....

For example, the Canadian Supreme Court addressed the question of overlapping
trademark and copyright protection in what is widely known as the case of the chocolate
bar wrappers. See Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Canada, Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can).
96 For an interesting summary of the positions surrounding the proposed European
Software Patents Directive, see Software Patents Bill Thrown Out, BBC NEWS (July 6,
2005, 12:03 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4655955.stm. An analysis of the
problems from an open source perspective is provided by Heather J. Meeker, The Fuzzy
Software Patent Debate Rages On, LINUX INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2005, 5:00 AM),
http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/40676.html.
9
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The case of programs today is very different from
that of books a hundred years ago. The fact that the
easiest way to copy a program is from one neighbor
to another, the fact that a program has both source
code and object code which are distinct, and the fact
that a program is used rather than read and enjoyed,
combine to create a situation in which a person who
enforces a copyright is harming society as a whole
both materially and spiritually; in which a person
should not do so regardless of whether the law
enables him to. 97
But, secondly, open access also recognizes certain interests that
resemble, at least superficially, the moral rights of authors in the
literary and artistic context. The interests of attribution and
integrity are present in the terms of open access software, both in
the Free Software Foundation's GNU license, and beyond.98 No
doubt, this assertion would be rather unpopular with Stallman
himself, who includes a rebuttal of the natural rights basis of
"ownership" in his essay, Why Software Should Not Have Owners:
Authors often claim a special connection with
programs they have written, and go on to assert that,
as a result, their desires and interests concerning the
program simply outweigh those of anyone else-or
even those of the whole rest of the world. (Typically
companies, not authors, hold the copyrights on
software, but we are expected to ignore this
discrepancy.) 99

97
Richard Stallman,
The
GNU
Manifesto, GNU
OPERATING
SYS.,
http://www.gnu.org/gnulmanifesto.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter GNU

Manifesto].
98 For an excellent list of free software licenses see Various Licenses and Comments

About Them, GNU OPERATING Sys., http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
99 Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Not Have Owners, GNU OPERATING SYS.,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-free.html (last visited July 20, 2011) [hereinafter
Software Should Not Have Owners]. Stallman goes on to comment:

To those who propose this as an ethical axiom-the author is more important than you-I
can only say that I, a notable software author myself, call it bunk.
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In his critique of natural rights theories of copyright ownership,
Stallman approaches the issue with a blunt tool rather than a
finely-tuned instrument. Stallman's analysis of natural rights
raises three major issues. First, the analogy between a work and
material objects is, indeed, overstretched, as natural rights theory
would argue that the damage resulting from mistreatment of one's
work is fundamentally different from material harm. The concept
of moral harm is not well developed in common law countries, but
it is a foundation of civil law systems.100 Secondly, the point that
authors are not the main beneficiaries of copyright ownership is
noted by him,10 ' but the fact that authors' natural rights provide a
counterweight to the interests of the copyright-owner is not
discussed. Finally, the analysis is quite U.S.-centric. What about
the role of natural rights theories in other copyright systems of the
world, which are author-focused in a way that U.S. law is not? Do

But people in general are only likely to feel any sympathy with the natural rights claims
for two reasons.
One reason is an overstretched analogy with material objects. When I cook spaghetti, I
do object if someone else eats it, because then I cannot eat it. His action hurts me exactly
as much as it benefits him; only one of us can eat the spaghetti, so the question is, which
one? The smallest distinction between us is enough to tip the ethical balance.
But whether you run or change a program I wrote affects you directly and me only
indirectly. Whether you give a copy to your friend affects you and your friend much
more than it affects me. I shouldn't have the power to tell you not to do these things. No
one should.
The second reason is that people have been told that natural rights for authors is the
accepted and unquestioned tradition of our society.
As a matter of history, the opposite is true. The idea of natural rights of authors was
proposed and decisively rejected when the US Constitution was drawn up. That's why
the Constitution only permits a system of copyright and does not require one; that's why
it says that copyright must be temporary. It also states that the purpose of copyright is to
promote progress-not to reward authors. Copyright does reward authors somewhat, and
publishers more, but that is intended as a means of modifying their behavior.
The real established tradition of our society is that copyright cuts into the natural rights of
the public-and that this can only be justified for the public's sake.
'00 See P.R. Handford, Moral Damages in Germany, 27(4) INT'L COMP. L.Q. 849, 851
(1978). ("The civil law offers a refreshing contrast to the common law, not only because
of its wholehearted acceptance of claims for injury to feelings and other non-pecuniary
loss, but also because of its orderly appearance in comparison to the patchwork quilt of
the common law.").
1o1 See Stallman, GNU Manifesto, supra note 97; Stallman, Software Should Not Have
Owners, supra note 99.
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natural rights of authorship lead to unethical situations, in
Stallman's terms, in those cultural contexts?
In fact, the Free Software movement does recognize
attribution, integrity, and disclosure;' 02 but it recognizes them in
precise and narrow forms. Attribution of the author of software
may help to protect the integrity of source code. Knowing who has
made any given modification can help to identify and correct
problems.
Stallman confirms, "[I]f you have distributed a
modified version and a previous developer asks for a copy of it,
you must send one. (Note that such a rule still leaves you the
choice of whether to distribute your version at all.)" It is also
"acceptable" that you be required to "identify yourself as the
author of modifications. 0 3
This right of integrity is not focused on the author. Rather, its
objective is to protect the "work"-in this case, software-for the
good of the community that uses and enjoys it, works with it, and,
very possibly, attempts to improve it.104 It is akin to a right to
protect the integrity of a work of art for the sake of cultural
heritage-the rationale of the Indian court in the Amar Nath Sehgal
case.10 5
The person working with software also has the right to choose
whether or not he will release those changes publicly-a classic
statement of the right of disclosure, which is, like attribution and
integrity, an accepted form of moral rights protection.o0 There is
See Richard Stallman, The Free Software Definition, GNU OPERATING SYs.,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last visited July 20, 2011) [hereinafter The
Free Software Definition]; Stallman, Motives for Writing, infra note 107 (noting
recognition of attribution and integrity); Stallman, Open Source Misses the Point, infra
note 108 (noting recognition of disclosure).
103 Stallman, The Free Software Definition, supra note
102.
104 Although, in keeping with the principle of "freedom," any
modification is allowed,
even if it may not amount to an "improvement" in the next person's opinion. See
Stallman, The Free Software Definition, supra note 102.
105 Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India (2005) 30 P.T.C. 253 (Del.).
106 In fact, the right of disclosure is considered so fundamental that it is often
said to be
implied into the language of the Berne Convention. See Stallman, The Free Software
Definition, supra note 102 ("You should also have the freedom to make modifications
and use them privately in your own work or play, without even mentioning that they
exist. If you do publish your changes, you should not be required to notify anyone in
particular, or in any particular way.").
102

2011]

CREATIVE COMMONS

943

an interesting contrast here between the apparent rejection of
authorship as it confers any special privileges on the individual
programmer, and the right to maintain control over one's own
modifications. "Freedom" apparently does not include the right to
have access to other people's modifications of software. Stallman
also makes another concession to authorship in his comments on
the "motivations" behind free software: professional reputation and
the admiration of one's peers are recognized motives behind the
making of free software. 0 7 These are exactly the same human
drives underlying the moral rights of attribution and integrity.
In relation to software, Stallman's concept of "free" essentially
has to do with the fact that the software is nonproprietary in
nature.
In describing the fundamental differences between free
software and open source, Stallman comments:
For the free software movement, free software is an
ethical imperative, because only free software
respects the users' freedom. By contrast, the
philosophy of open source considers issues in terms
of how to make software "better"-in a practical
sense only. It says that nonfree software is an
inferior solution to the practical problem at hand.
For the free software movement, however, nonfree
software is a social problem, and the solution is to
stop using it and move to free software.1 0 9
On the other hand, commercial uses of free software are
accepted, and even encouraged, as long as the software that is sold
continues to be "free"-amenable to modification and distribution
at the will of the user. Many models of open access, or open

Richard Stallman, Motives for Writing Free Software, GNU OPERATING SYS.,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fs-motives.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Motives for Writing] ("To be admired. If you write a successful, useful free program, the
users will admire you. That feels very good. Professional reputation. If you write a
successful, useful free program, that will suffice to show you are a good programmer.").
1os See Richard Stallman, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, GNU
OPERATING Sys., http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Open Source Misses the Point].
109 Stallman, Open Source Misses the Point, supra note 108.
107
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source, software exist, and one approach is to restrict the right of a
user to use the software for commercial purposes.
From a "free software" perspective, this issue is not important,
as it is the right to use software freely that is really the heart of this
movement. Indeed, the preference for publishing software through
copyleft models of licensing over simply releasing software into
the public domain is due to the desire to prevent software from
becoming anyone's property. In the copyleft scenario, anyone who
attempts to convert the software into intellectual property will be
legally liable for two things: breaking the terms of the software
license, which he accepted when he acquired the software, and,
potentially, violating the "author's" copyright in the software:
Copyleft says that anyone who redistributes the
software, with or without changes, must pass along
the freedom to further copy and change it. Copyleft
guarantees that every user has freedom.
Copyleft also provides an incentive for other
programmers to add to free software. Important free
programs such as the GNU C++ compiler exist only
because of this." 0
The reliance on the copyleft model again makes the
attribution and integrity interests important. Attribution is needed
because of copyright's dependence on an author to sue; integrity is
needed in order to show what kind of unauthorized use has
occurred, which would qualify as an infringement of copyright in
the work.
In particular, it would be important to show
unauthorized appropriation, use, or the creation of an
"unauthorized" derivative work. The threshold will be low;
practically any evidence of modification would do, but some
evidence must be offered.
The appearance of moral rights in alternative models of
software regulation comes as a surprise. However, the practical
relevance of moral rights to the needs of software is immediately
apparent. A right of attribution can preserve accountability and
access to help when problems arise; it can also protect useful

1o

Stallman, Open Source Misses the Point, supra note 108.
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knowledge and build community by drawing attention to the
accomplishments of highly skilled and creative programmers. The
integrity principle also has something to contribute to software.
Preserving the integrity of code helps to develop knowledge, while
protecting subsequent users from problems-flaws, errors, or
sabotage.
Moral rights also reflect certain philosophical parallels with the
free and open software movements. The integrity principle can
offer practical support to the goals of these movements. In the
case of free software, it could prevent proprietary treatments of
code; and, in effect, Stallman's concept that the conversion of free
software into property would violate its moral integrity, in the
large sense of the term, finds ready sympathy in the moral right of
integrity recognized in much of the world. Once again, this
approach to integrity finds parallels in a right for the protection of
cultural heritage. It is not so much an author-focused right as a
work-focused principle."'
Nevertheless, the author, too, makes an appearance in free and
open software movements. Reputation matters. The needs of
programmers may be different from those of artists, but that does
not make the claims of artists unreasonable. Rather, as Stallman
himself notes, the nature of their work is different. In the creation
of software, attribution can support the needs of authorship; but the
nature of the medium demands a willingness to change and be
changed. Without the ability to change what comes before, to
build upon it in freedom and without fear of limitation, a
meaningful software community might cease to exist. The drive
towards further development is a reality of all forms of human
knowledge, but the degree of flexibility required, and the intensity
of the intervention, will vary according to the nature of the work.
If the need to intervene creatively in a work of classic literature
could be colored a soft pearl grey, the software environment
presents the case of a brilliant fuchsia. Where software is
concerned, intervention is the key to innovation.

11 For a detailed discussion of moral rights and software, including a discussion of how
the rights could be reshaped and adapted to the software environment, see SUNDARA
RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 7, ch. 5.
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III. COLLECTIVE CREATION: MORAL RIGHTS AND WEB 2.0

Collective creation is one of the fascinating opportunities for
In the Web
human cooperation created by the Internet.
environment, cooperation assumes totally new proportions, uniting
people across vast distances who may never have been able to
work together in the absence of technology. The work might be
undertaken anonymously or in explicit partnership; by a small
group of collaborators or an indefinite worldwide community.
Wikipedia is perhaps the best-known collaborative phenomenon.l12
The ubiquitous Web-wide encyclopedia is built almost entirely on
the contributions of the general public, who initiate the coverage of
new topics, or modify existing entries with a view to correcting
and improving their content.1 3 The founders of Wikipedia hope
that the phenomenon will ultimately expand into new languages
other than English."14
The possibilities of Web-based collaboration have only begun
to be explored. They could include many activities, built on
different approaches to gathering, developing, and disseminating
knowledge. Music offers some interesting examples. Through
Web-based interactions, South Indian classical music is now taught
in the United States by teachers in India who have never flown in a
plane."' The use of special instruments has transformed music in
112

Wikipedia: When in Doubt, Multitudes Seek It Out, PEwRESEARCHCENTER PUBL'NS,

http://pewresearch.org /pubs/460/wikipedia (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
"3

See

Wikipedia:

About,

WIKIPEDIA-THE

FREE

ENCYCLOPEDIA,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Apr. 23, 2011) ("Wikipedia
is written collaboratively by largely anonymous Internet volunteers who write without
pay. Anyone with Internet access can write and make changes to Wikipedia articles
(except in certain cases where editing is restricted to prevent disruption or vandalism).
Users can contribute anonymously, under a pseudonym, or with their real identity, if they
choose."). But see Alex Krotoski, Liberty, Wikipedia and a Voice for All, BBC (July 21,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/digitalrevolution/2009/07/liberty-wikipedia-and-a2009),
voice.shtml (arguing that "the Wikipedia phenomenon replicates the existing structures of
power and control of information thanks to the spontaneously generated new gatekeepers
who have grown out of that most important of web assets, the community").
114
See Emma Barnett, Jimmy Wales Interview: Wikipedia is Focusing on Accuracy,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/wikipedial
6589487/Jimmy-Wales-interview-Wikipedia-is-focusing-on-accuracy.html.
115 The South Indian school of classical music is called "Carnatic" music, while the
North Indian branch is known as "Hindustani." Both schools represent a common system
of music with different styles, scales, and instruments. Teaching of Carnatic music in the
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many traditions. Musicians from Western and non-Western
traditions build artistic collaborations through technology,
exploring and developing new forms of musical expression.116
These creative possibilities have barely begun to develop, and they
hint at a world of unimagined potential for the development of
culture through technology.
What is the legal status of contributors to Wikipedia?
Technically speaking, they are authors. They write the texts that
form the basis of Wikipedia entries, and, according to universally
recognized principles of copyright law, the level of originality
required of a text writer can almost certainly be met by a
contributor to Wikipedia.11 7 Small modifications to existing text
may not qualify for copyright protection; but larger changes and,
of course, new contributions can. However, the contributions are
made in the foreknowledge that they will be subject to editing.
The integrity of the original contribution cannot be maintainedthat was never intended to be the case. The very purpose of the
contribution is to make something available to others for
modification.
These circumstances could place Wikipedia in a situation of
legal difficulty in countries where moral rights of attribution and
integrity are recognized-something that Wikipedia should note as
In particular, if there are
it attempts to expand globally.
restrictions on an author's ability to waive moral rights, as in

United States is done via Skype-the free online software that allows Internet users to
call each other from their computers by audio only, or by video and audio transmission.
The United States connections made by Carnatic artists are widely publicized in India.
116 For example, see the interesting discussion of cross-cultural musical conversations
in Gary Giddins, A Passageto India: Rudresh Mahanthappa Chooses a Heritage, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/musical/2009/03/02/
090302crmu musicgiddins#. The article is among the first publications outside India to
draw attention to the remarkable talent of South Indian saxophonist Kadri Gopalnath and
his brilliant group, including leading violinist, Kanyakumari.
117 It seems likely that this would be the case whether the jurisdiction in question
recognized the "sweat of the brow," labor-oriented standard of creativity in classic cases
like University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press (1916) 2 Ch. 601 and
Ladbroke (Football)v. William Hill (Football) 1964 1 All E.R. 465 (HL); the higher
requirement of "skill and judgment" in Eastern Book Co. & Ors v. D.B. Modak & Anr.,
(2008) 1 S.C.C. 1 (India); or the "modicum of creativity" in Feist Publications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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France and Germany, the potential problem of an author wanting
to assert rights of attribution and integrity could fundamentally
threaten the existence of this resource.
The persistence of moral rights in a technological context
whose very objective is to transcend the limits of individual
authorship seems like a strange anomaly. If countries with strong
moral rights protection are interested in encouraging technologybased collaboration on the Wikipedia model, they should consider
special modifications to the legal limitations on waivers. For
example, a three-step test could be established. If the criteria of
anonymity, the expectation of unlimited modification, and the goal
of general public access are met by a given technology, it would be
appropriate to say that the author agrees to suspend his or her
moral rights in relation to this project.'
The terminology of suspending one's moral rights seems to be
a more accurate reflection of what should happen in the Wikipedia
context than a "waiver" of rights. Waiver suggests that rights
exist, but are set aside. In the Wikipedia context, however, it
seems that one's involvement is entirely outside the scope of moral
rights. To put it another way, you, as the contributor of text to
Wikipedia, are not the author. Instead, the author is a collective
entity, partly made up of the efforts of individual contributors, but
a being which goes beyond them, and is greater than the sum of its
parts.
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is also apparent that the
concepts of attribution and integrity may have some relevance to
Wikipedia. Attribution of contributors could help to establish that
a particular piece of knowledge is authoritative-for example, a
person with specialist or insider knowledge of a given subject may
be in a position to make a valuable contribution to a Wikipedia
entry. At the same time, attributing special contributors would
probably go against the ethos of Wikipedia, which is democratic in
Wikipedia relies upon the
the purest sense of the term.
contributions of the general public, and its audience is the general
Wikipedia editors include anonymous contributors and regular editors who are
identified through the system. For a discussion of the editing process and ongoing
changes to it, see Bamett, supra note 114.
118
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public, which seeks out information or knowledge on a particular
subject. The attribution issue could be resolved by a simple,
cosmetic solution. Individual authors could be attributed by
Wikipedia-for example, in a list of contributors to a particular
page, to which any person modifying the page could add his or her
name-while the possibility of removing or modifying another
person's name could be excluded. What would be the value of
such an attribution practice?
This leads to a second point: the importance of maintaining the
integrity of an information resource like Wikipedia. Here, too, the
problem presents a fundamental challenge to the philosophy
underlying this public encyclopedia. It is possible for incorrect
information to develop, and the global and popular reach of
Wikipedia means that this resource could become a significant
factor behind public misinformation.
A third point should also be noted. Moral rights might not only
be held by the contributors to Wikipedia; they could also be
enjoyed by many of the people who become the subjects of
Wikipedia entries. Moral rights are especially important where
those individuals are, themselves, engaged in creative work.
Misinformation about a person or his work could damage his
reputation-or, perhaps more precisely, and in the language of the
Berne Convention, his "honor."119 The use of the archaic term
"honor" in Berne seems to carry connotations of personal harm. In
this sense, a strong argument could be made that harming a
person's professional or personal reputation through statements
made in a Wikipedia entry would violate that person's honor.
Inappropriate comments about a person's work or personal life
could amount to violations of the subject's moral rights of integrity
or reputation. 2 0
119 See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis.

This is a fine legal point. As noted by the court in the U.S. case of Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949), modification of the work is usually a precondition
to a finding that integrity has been violated. See discussion supra note 47. False
information or reviews of a work could arguably qualify as a form of direct
"modification"; perhaps for this reason, the French law recognizes a specific right against
excessive criticism, although it is now a part of French personal law rather than the
Intellectual Property Code. See Georges Michailid6s-Nouaros, LE DROIT MORAL DE
120
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From a moral rights perspective, collective creation along the
lines of Wikipedia presents a fundamental challenge. Collective
works are a dramatic demonstration of creativity whose essential
purpose is to receive and modify texts provided by others.
Wikipedia offers an infinitely more open model of knowledge than
even free software. In the case of software, the nature of the
medium demands the freedom to modify preexisting works, and all
models of nonproprietary software-free or open, commercial or
nonprofit, pure or hybrid-rely on open access to at least some part
of the code embedded in the software.121 But in the case of
Wikipedia, the text cannot exist without the freedom to modify.
The underlying philosophy is that collective efforts will gather
enough knowledge, expertise, and commitment to arrive largely at
correct
information-a
phenomenon
also
known
as
"crowdsourcing."l22 In a sense, the principle of preserving the
integrity of knowledge becomes self-executing through the law of
averages.
If that is the hope, there is also widespread skepticism about
the value of crowdsourcing.
Modem media is totally
nondiscriminatory: it gives the opportunity to project an opinion to
anyone and everyone, and it builds consensus among large and
disparate groups of people. Depending on the circumstances,
either quality of technology could have a positive or negative
L'AUTEUR: ETUDE DE DROIT FRANCAIS, DE DROIT COMPARE ET DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,

168-70 (Donald D. Barry, ed., Librairie Arthur Rousseau 1935); LAW AND THE
GORBACHEV ERA: ESSAYS

IN HONOR OF DIETRICH ANDRt LOEBER 287-89 (1988).

Comments about one's personal life do not violate the integrity of the work, but they may
affect one's personal reputation; a moral right of reputation would be violated, but not the
moral right of integrity. In relation to Wikipedia misinformation, a notorious 2005
incident involved the falsification of journalist John Siegenthaler's biography, which he
discovered four months after it was first posted. See the comment by Charles Cooper,
Perspective: Wikipedia and the Nature of Truth, CNET NEWS (Dec. 2, 2005, 4:00 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/Wikipedia-and-the-nature-of-truth/2010-1025_3-5979331 .html.
121 Colin Tapper notes that "modification can be accomplished either by access to
source code or object code (the route from the former to the latter is no more than the
application of another program, a compiler)," and he observes that "the more skilled the
programmer the more he will choose to modify object code so as to achieve precisely the
result that is sought." E-mail to author (July 14, 2010) (on file with author).
122 Julia Angwin & Geoffrey J. Fowler, Volunteers Log Off as Wikipedia Ages, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125893981183759969.html?
mod=rssToday'sMost Popular.
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consequence. In a recent book, Jaron Lanier warns that Internet
collectivism suppresses individuality and encourages the
development of a mob-rule mentality. 123 Reviewing the book for
the New York Times, Michiko Kakutani writes:
Mr. Lanier sensibly notes that the "wisdom of
crowds" is a tool that should be used selectively, not
glorified for its own sake. Of Wikipedia he writes
that "it's great that we now enjoy a cooperative pop
culture concordance" but argues that the site's ethos
ratifies the notion that the individual voice-even
the voice of an expert-is eminently dispensable,
and "the idea that the collective is closer to the
truth." He complains that Wikipedia suppresses the
sound of individual voices, and similarly contends
that the rigid format of Facebook turns individuals
into "multiple-choice identities." 24
It is a well-known clich6 that technology is not inherently good
or evil. Rather, it is the use made of technology that tends to give
it its moral flavor. New technology offers tremendous hope for
improving the conditions of life in many parts of the worldimagine the excitement of bringing information and education to a
place like rural India, and helping to empower the lives of poor
people. Technology has the potential to promote democracy on a
global scale.' 25 What will we decide to use it for?
It is currently rumored that Wikipedia is moving towards a
more hierarchical structure, with increased editorial supervision of
its pages. One of the apparent reasons for this shift is concern for
the integrity of Wikipedia's presentations in the wake of recent
embarrassments.126 The popularity of the Wikipedia project
See Jaron Lanier, You ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2010).
124 Michiko Kakutani, A Rebel in Cyberspace, FightingCollectivism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/books/I5book.html.
125 For example, the recent revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were both supported by
mobile technology.
126 A premature declaration of U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy's death is one example. See
Angwin & Fowler, supra note 122. A study by Dr. Felipe Ortega found that 49,000
people had stopped editing Wikipedia pages in the early part of 2009, as compared to
about 4,900 in a parallel period in 2008. Wikipedia disputes the statistics for various
123
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appears to be declining among users, who complain of overzealous
editing that leads to the deletion of time-consuming and hard-won
contributions.127 The general vulnerability of Wikipedia to virtual
"vandals" who deliberately post misinformation or advertising is
also a growing concern. 128 Julia Angwin and Geoffrey J. Fowler
note that the culture of Wikipedia is in the midst of a transition:
Wikipedia contributors have been debating widely
what is behind the decline in volunteers. One factor
is that many topics already have been written about.
Another is the plethora of rules Wikipedia has
adopted to bring order to its unruly universeparticularly to reduce infighting among contributors
about write-ups of controversial subjects and

polarizing figures.

129

If these rumors prove to be true, they will signify the failure of
the Wikipedia ethos--or at least, the watering-down of its puredemocracy vision. Every modern idealist should save one sigh for
Wikipedia.
IV. OWNERSHIP OF OPEN SOURCE? GOOGLE BOOKS AND THE
ALTERNATIVES

The prospect of digital libraries is among the most exciting of
new developments in the Digital Age. From a practical point of
view, digitization responds to the age-old problem of access to
The constraints of
knowledge with marvelous directness.
geographical location and the need for library privileges could
easily be overcome if digital archives were available. How do
moral rights play into this historic opportunity?
To fulfill its purpose, a digital archive must meet certain
criteria. First, access to the archive must be stable, in two senses:
reasons. See Wikipedia Denies Mass Exodus of Editors, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2009,
11:30 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8382477.stm.
127 These editors are known as "deletionists," and the rate at which new
contributions
are now deleted is one out of four, as compared to one out of ten in 2005. Angwin &
Fowler, supra note 122.
128 See Angwin & Fowler, supra
note 122.
129 See Angwin & Fowler, supra note
122.
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it should be available consistently, across time zones and
geographical regions, and its long-term existence and accessibility
must also be assured. Secondly, the information in the archive
must be reliable. A third criterion exists, but it is legal rather than
practical: any digital library project must adopt a successful
approach to copyright rules.
On all three counts, the Google Books project has generated
significant discomfort. Prior to the ruling of Judge Chin on the
latest version of the Google Book Settlement, Google hoped to
scan and create digitized versions of every existing book.13 0 At
first glance, Google's initiative was very exciting, because it would
have permanently thrown open the doors of knowledge to anyone
with access to the most basic technology. But the project was
mired in controversy almost from the beginning. Interestingly, the
reasons articulated by the various groups that sued Google largely
had to do with Google's treatment of copyright issues. 1 3 1
Copyright law requires the authorization of the person who
owns the copyright in a book before it can be copied. The only
exception to this rule is where the purpose of copying is a "fair
use" or "fair dealing" with the work that is not subject to copyright
protection-private enjoyment, use of a small portion, or citation
of the work, for example. Where books in print are concernedSee About Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/
history.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
131 See Jonathan Sempel and Georgina Prodhan, Google Sued by Visual Artists
over
Book Scanning, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2010, 3:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/
04/07/us-google-copyright-lawsuit-idUSTRE6362HP20100407; see generally GOOGLE
BOOK SETTLEMENT, http://www.googlebooksettlement.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
The history of legal actions against Google since the books project was launched in 2004
is summarized by Hector L. MacQueen. Hector L. MacQueen, The Google Book
Settlement, 40(3) INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 247 (2009). The issue of
whether such an important initiative should be entrusted to a private corporation has also
been prominent, particularly in Europe. It reflects concerns about reliability, but in a
political sense rather than a practical one. See, e.g., Scott Sayare, France: More
Publishers Sue Google, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/01/world/europe/0lbriefs-Francebrief.html; Google Book Scanning: Cultural
Theft or Freedom of Information?, CNN (Feb. 8, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/europe/02/08/google.livres.france/index.html. More complete coverage may be
found at James Kantner & Eric Pfanner, Google Tackles Fears on Rights in Book Deal,
N.Y. TIMES Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/technology/intemet/
08books.html.
130
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works that are, in the language of the failed Google Books
Settlement, "commercially available"-the authorization of the
copyright-owner must be secured before the book will be made
available through the online search facility.' 32 It should be noted
that, under the Settlement, Google would not have been prevented
from scanning these books--only from making them available
online. 133

In relation to out-of-print books, Google's approach became
more interesting. Sergey Brin, a co-founder of Google, identified
the objective of making out-of-print books available to the public
as a fundamental goal of the project. 134 He also pointed out that
the profit from "orphan" books is what made the project financially
viable:
[AIttorneys for Google and the book publishers and
authors told [Judge] Chin that the settlement isn't
perfect but is fair. Google's attorney told the court
that the company is indeed interested in getting its
hands on rights to so-called "orphan works," the
term used to describe titles where the author isn't
known or can't be found.
The question of properly paying someone who is
entitled to compensation under Google's plan but
may not be aware of it has been a hot issue. Google
said that the money earnedfrom orphan works is
what will make the digital library a feasible
business. Google's attorney said that others, such
as Microsoft, who attempted to digitize books in the

132 See Amended Settlement Agreement at 6, 25, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05
Nov. 9, 2011) available at
Civ. 8136, 2011 WL 986049 (S.D.N.Y.
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/view-settlement agreement. (last visited Apr.
25, 2011).
133 See MacQueen, supra note 131, at 248. This is a curious aspect of the agreement.
Regardless, how could Google's activities be monitored or controlled by outsiders? The
project would have to be shut down on allegations of copyright infringement; it seems
that in practice, there would not be any other way to prevent Google from scanning
books.
134 See Sergey Brin, A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/opinion/09brin.html.
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past couldn't monetize their efforts this way and
that'swhy they failed.'3 5
Indeed, there was, and is, every reason to applaud the idea in
principle: books may go out of print for various reasons, including
publishers' arbitrariness, conflicts between authors and publishers,
and the inadequate marketing of valuable books. Digitizing them
could provide a valuable second chance at life. In the case of
"orphan" works, the holders of the copyright in these books cannot
be located. Unclaimed by authors or publishers, orphan works are
estimated to represent a large proportion of the overall collections
of the world's libraries.' 36 Clearly, out-of-print and orphan works
could represent a vast storehouse of human knowledge.
In dealing with out-of-print books, Google wanted to dispense
with copyright's need for the "authorization" of copies. Instead, if
an author or publisher who owns the rights in an out-of-print book
decided that it should not be made available online by Google, he
would have been required to object to the inclusion of the book in
Google's project. Google advocated this "opt-out" approach for
ostensibly practical reasons.137
From a legal point of view, however, the "opt-out" provisions
could not have been more radical. Google was effectively
No
reversing the normal operation of copyright rules.138
authorization would have been required for scanning or online
access; instead, the failure to object would lead to a presumption of
consent. 139 What was perhaps most significant about these
arrangements was the fact that Google would have been under no

Greg Sandoval, Google Book Settlement Draws Fire in Court, CNET NEWS (Feb.
18, 2010) (emphasis added), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10456382-261.html.
136 See Miguel Helft, Some Raise Alarms as Google Resurrects Out-of-Print Books,
13

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/technology/internet/
04books.html?pagewanted=1.
13 See MacQueen, supra note 131, at 247.
138 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that the proposed settlement agreement "propose[d] to expropriate rights of
individuals involuntarily," possibly in contravention of the U.S. Copyright Act).
139 Id. at 681 ("Absent class members who fail to opt out will be deemed to have
released their rights even as to future infringing conduct.").
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obligation whatsoever to attempt to locate the owner of copyright

in the work. 140
The latest version of the Google Books Settlement had
introduced some moderation into this proposal by requiring an
independent body to oversee the digitization of "orphan" works.
Royalties from the dissemination of orphan works would be held
for ten years.141 After that time, the monies earned were to be
redirected into public nonprofit schemes in support of culture.' 42
But these provisions would have led to permanent arrangements.
If the owner of an orphan work were to come forward after ten
years, he would have forfeited his rights and his royalties.
Once again, this was a fundamental rethinking of copyright
norms. Ordinarily, the owner of the copyright in a work is under
little obligation to show that he maintains an active interest in the
work: whether or not he is vigilant in protecting the copyright, he
generally retains the right to sue for unauthorized use of the work
throughout the life of the copyright. 14 3 The Google scheme seems
to require something like the vigilance of a trademark-owner by
the holder of the copyright in an orphan work. But copyright is not
normally subject to "dilution" in the same way as a trademark,
through the practical circumstance of exploitation by others.
Copyright depends, rather, on the act of creation. The author
decides who should exploit the work on his behalf, and how.
The treatment of orphan works was perhaps the most
controversial aspect of the Google Books project. Google planned
to create a Book Rights Registry, which would also have been
empowered to license books to others;144 but further licensing
would have depended on the agreement of the copyright holders in
Id. at 682 ("[I]t is incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place the
onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when Google copied
their works without first seeking their permission.").
141 See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 84.
142 See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra
note 132, at 84.
143 This situation presents an interesting contrast with trademark law. Nevertheless,
it is
possible that a copyright-owner's conduct can be judged to amount to a form of
acquiescence to the allegedly infringing activity. Such a provision tacitly seems to
underlie the Google scenario; after ten years, an owner of copyright should reasonably be
expected to know that his book is available via Google.
144 Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 80.
140
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those books. 145 In the case of orphan books, which Google would
have acquired without the permission of the copyright-holders,
further licensing to anyone new would not be possible. In effect,
Google would have gained a practical monopoly over orphan
books without ever having obtained authorization to scan and
circulate them from any of the authors or owners of copyright in
those works.146 This would amount to exclusive ownership of
orphan works. As Miguel Helft, writing for the New York Times,
notes:
While the registry's agreement with Google is not
exclusive, the registry will be allowed to license to
others only the books whose authors and publishers
have explicitly authorized it. Since no such
authorization is possible for orphan works, only
Google would have access to them, so only Google
could assemble a truly comprehensive book

database. 147
Other concerns with Google's plans involve broad social
issues, such as privacy. Privacy has often been a thorny problem
for Google, and the uses to which Google could put its vast store of
digitized information extend into various kinds of information
services that could violate both the privacy of users and the
exclusivity of authors and publishers.
There is also the issue of Google's breathtaking audacityperhaps felt even more keenly outside the United States, where the
culture of entrepreneurship may not always come as naturally.
Whether it is appropriate for a private corporation to undertake a
project of such immense public significance is a persistent murmur
underlying much of the debate.148 On this point, the approach of
Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 68-69.
See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (noting that this was one of the objections
to the Google Books Settlement).
147 See Miguel Helft, Google's Planfor Out-of-PrintBooks Is Challenged,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/technology/intemet/04books.html?
pagewanted=1 &emc=eta 1.
148 See, e.g., Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The questions of
who should be entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and
with what safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than through
an agreement among private, self-interested parties.").
145
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the Internet Archive presents an interesting alternative: this
American nonprofit organization aims, among other things, to
create a Web page for every book ever published.14 9 A public
interest organization like this one could be entrusted with the
scanning of out-of-copyright books. Funded by public sources, the
digital archive could be made freely available, and the digital
resource would then belong to the public.
In Europe, France's Minister of Culture has recently expressed
his support for a state-funded initiative to match Google's
archive.15 ( In his comments, Minister Fr6d6ric Mitt6rand was
careful not to raise the specter of French anti-Americanism. He
argued:
For my part, there isn't any anti-Americanism.
Nevertheless, I believe [that] America isn't a
monolith, and different opinions must be expressed.
That's why I don't want the State to surrender
before the markets. . . .
It's not up to this or that private group to decide
policy on an issue as important as the digitization of
our global heritage. I'm not going to leave this
decision up to simple laissez-faire.' 5'
Moral rights have hardly been discussed at all in the context of
Google Books, but they present an important problem.152 Much of
the debate on Google has focused on the issue of profit. Google's
plan would have allowed the company to generate profit at the
The fundamental aim of the Internet Archive is the preservation of the Web itself as
a stable resource through time. The Internet Archive is active on numerous preservation
projects; for details, see http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Apr. 25,
2011).
1so Sophie Hardach, FrenchMinister Wants Europe to Take on Google, REUTERS (NOV.
27, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE5AQ4IJ20091127.
This discussion is reminiscent of the debate surrounding the human genome-and the
private versus public undertakings to sequence it. See In Human Genome Race,
Competition Spurred Better Science, HARV. GAZETTE, Feb. 23, 2001,
http://harvardscience.harvard.edu/medicine-health/articles/human-genome-racecompetition-spurred-better-science.
149

151 See Hardach, supranote 150.

152

MacQueen's overview of the settlement is an exception; he believes that "moral
rights, both of attribution and integrity, will remain extremely important." MacQueen,
supra note 131.
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expense of copyright-holders. It would have done so by securing
the profits of making orphan works available, and by establishing a
virtually assured monopoly in the possession of a truly
comprehensive digital library.
But Google's project deserved to generate intense public
interest in another sense. There can be little doubt that Google's
digital library would have revolutionized our sense of cultural
identity. In essence, if Google somehow manages to achieve its
aims, an immense body of human knowledge will be transformed
into a kind of giant Google document-subject to searching,
cutting, re-using, perhaps replacing. The burden of addressing this
issue falls to authors-not to copyright-owners. The concerns of
authors should extend beyond the question of royalties, to the issue
of how Google intends to treat their works.
If-when--Google proceeds with its digitization project in a
new incarnation, will the company be required to maintain
attribution of the works in its library? Will it preserve the integrity
of these works, and will users be required to respect the integrity of
works obtained from Google when redistributing them? Will the
uses made of the books conform to moral rights requirements? For
example, Google Books currently shows up to 20% of a book that
is in copyright as a sample to potential buyers. Do those samples
accurately reflect the content of the books, or do they misrepresent
the works, or cause damage to the authors' reputations? In relation
to orphan works, if nothing else, Google's approach clearly
undermines the author's right to decide whether or not his work
should be part of the Google Books archive-the moral right of
disclosure.
Given Google's international reach, concerns about moral
rights are particularly important. In fact, the issue of snippets has
already been litigated in France.153 Publisher La Martinibre
succeeded in obtaining E300,000 in damages relying, alongside its
claim for economic rights infringement that could not be allowed
as a "citation" for informative and noncommercial purposes, upon
153

See Madeleine Bourgois, NumdrisationInd&ente? Google Books Contre La
Martiniere,FLUCTUAT.NET (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.fluctuat.net/6914-Google-Bookscontre-La-Martiniere ("[L]es extraits sont illisibles, la qualit6 ex6crable, le texte
tronqonn6 . .
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the moral right of integrity. A lawyer for the Soci6t6 des Gens de
Lettres drew attention to the fact that, as far as the quality of
Google snippets is concerned- "the extracts are unreadable, the
quality execrable, the text decimated."l 5 4 The failed Google Books
Settlement had been scaled back to extend the proposed
arrangements only to certain English-speaking countries-Canada,
Australia, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States.' 55
But, barring the United States, all of these common law countries
protect the moral rights of their authors; and the Australian
scheme, in many respects, is a powerful moral rights regime along
the lines of Continental European norms. How can the tension
between the need to recognize moral rights abroad and their
absence from U.S. law be reconciled? There is every likelihood
that Google may eventually want to extend its activities to Europe
and Asia, as well. If the political climate supports this trend,
Google will become actively engaged in countries that are strongly
protective of moral rights.
In fact, the issue of maintaining the archive's quality should
militate in favor of diligent protection for moral rights. Google's
objective is to build a new Library of Alexandria.156 If so, then the
digital archive that it creates will represent the world's most
important repository of written knowledge. At the same time, this
repository will be preserved in a form that makes it vulnerable to
Indeed, from Google's perspective, the very
manipulation.
purpose of creating the archive is to manipulate its contents. By
providing snippets of books, making the text available for
searching, offering links to retailers, and including "discrete
advertising," in Robert Darnton's phrase, Google's purpose is to
manipulate the archive and generate revenues.157 Google is a
corporation. It wants to make money, and, in order to do so from
the Books project, the manipulation of the archive is a must.

154 See id.; see also Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books
Settlement, J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, nn.304-310 and accompanying text.
1s5 See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 84.

156 See Brin, supra note 134.
157 See Robert Darnton, Google and the Future ofBooks, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 12,

2009), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22281.
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As a counterweight to this underlying reality, the rights of
attribution and integrity should be emphasized. They can make an
important contribution to maintaining the authenticity of
knowledge in a digital environment. Indeed, in order to preserve
authenticity-in relation to new and old works, owned and
orphaned works-a digital archive would need to be governed by
general principles of attribution and integrity that would be built
into the archive, itself. A digital archive represents one of those
rare cases where moral interests are so overwhelmingly important
that their protection should not be left in the hands of authors and
their descendants, whose ability to act is limited. Attribution and
integrity should be protected in perpetuity in an archive.
Once again, the significance of disclosure in a digital
environment stands out. An author should be able to exercise his
or her moral right of disclosure to decide whether it would be
desirable to participate in the Google Books project. From a moral
rights perspective, it should be noted that the publisher's
permission would not be enough; the author's permission must
also be obtained. In an undertaking of such magnitude, one which
will permanently transform the nature of a work, it seems entirely
fitting to require permission for both economic exploitation and
moral protection.
Professor Hector MacQueen is one of the few writers on
Google Books to note the importance of moral rights. He remarks:
Copying is unavoidable in the digital world... ; so
perhaps, at least in this context (which may
increasingly be the only context that really matters),
copyright as a right to prevent copying should be
abandoned. Privacy and confidentiality rights may
serve better to protect the work which the author
does not intend for publication of any kind, while
moral rights of attribution and integrity can be the
bulwark of other authorial interests, offset by
appropriately framed exceptions for education,
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Open access movements generally recognize the importance of
moral interests. These movements are ideologically diverse, but in
all of them, moral rights seem to emerge out of practical concerns
about maintaining the integrity of the open source environment.
The language of natural rights of authorship is explicitly-perhaps
disingenuously-rejected by the free software community, but the
copyleft community evidently has a soft-hearted sympathy for
creative individuals.
Where Creative Commons is concerned, it is possible to go one
step further: moral rights are the foundation of the Creative
Commons approach to knowledge. Creative Commons is based on
the voluntary sharing of work; in exchange, authors expect to
receive, not money, but recognition. Reputation is the currency of
the Creative Commons system. At the same time, as the example
of free software also clarifies, the emphasis on attribution and
integrity provides a larger benefit to the public as a whole: it helps
to preserve the quality and authenticity of valuable knowledge.
An examination of the approach to moral issues in the Creative
Commons and free software movements leads to a striking
conclusion: not only should moral rights be recognized in a digital
environment, but their recognition should also be expanded in two
important ways. First, as access to knowledge comes to be
recognized as a human right, a corresponding human right of
creators should be established. Moral rights can provide the
foundational principles of such a right-disclosure, attribution, and
integrity. Moral rights can also provide the proper practical
framework: the doctrine behind moral rights firmly excludes the
possibility of corporate ownership or possession.
They are
personal rights of an author, dependent on a human being to invest
them with meaning, and to exercise them. The recognition of a
human creative right is important, not only to protect authors and
158

MacQueen, supra note 131, at 249.
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their works, but also to shield society as a whole from the
consequences of losing contact with its own humanity. Intellectual
life is an intrinsic part of human existence. Technology cannot
replace culture; machine cannot replace man or woman.
The second area of growth for moral rights may, surprisingly,
carry them into the area of economic rights. Much of the attitude
of open access movements is based on the idea of "free" access.
While the free software movement and Creative Commons both
emphasize the importance of freedom in an ideological sense, in
practice, the Creative Commons licensing system often implies
freedom from payment. In this sense, the model of "free" use has
its appeal and its purposes. But it does not respond to the problem
of how to maintain artistic professions or, in a more fundamental
sense, how to establish value for intellectual creation.
Historically, intellectuals have often been an impoverished
group. Given this reality, the denial of economic benefits to
authors seems like nothing other than a new form of social
oppression.
It is cultural oppression, and it perpetuates
stereotypes-the impoverished artist at work in his attic studio,
caring little for the pleasures of the world-that can implicitly
justify oppression. 159
Both the substance and the language of copyright should
evolve to meet these new concerns. Copyright law should be
meticulous in distinguishing between the author of a work and the
owner of rights in it-once again, a clarification favored by the
moral rights tradition. In the digital context, it is also clear that the
right of disclosure, in both its moral and economic dimensions, has
acquired a new importance. The one right that can be definitely
controlled by the author is the initial publication of his or her work.
This initial release in digital form should perhaps generate the bulk
of the author's earnings from the work. The problem of works
appreciating in value over time could then be dealt with as in the
artist's resale right, or droit de suite by levying an author's royalty
as a small percentage of the sale price on subsequent transactions.

159

No doubt, there are artists who fit this model. The argument here is that it should not

be imposed on all artists.
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An author's royalty could easily be processed through collective
licensing schemes for the use of creative work.
In contrast, neither Wikipedia nor Google recognizes moral
rights and, in each case, the failure to do so is likely to lead to both
legal and social problems. In Wikipedia's case, the voluntary
waiver of moral rights may make sense in the context of an
undertaking that is consciously and explicitly collaborative and
anonymous. But Google finds itself on the opposite side of the
public-private divide. Where the Google Books scheme is
concerned, Google should be prevailed upon to recognize the
moral rights of authors in all its dealings with works. Indeed, not
only should attribution and integrity be recognized by Google, but
the sanctity of disclosure should also be respected.
The implication of the moral right of disclosure for Google's
plans is, of course, that the "opt-out" approach to books will not
work. The consent of authors must be secured.160 In the case of
orphan works, Google should institute a process to demonstrate
good faith in its search for authors. If a work is truly "orphaned,"
Google should benefit from a waiver of the right of disclosure.
The ten-year period in which authors could still come forward to
claim orphan works would be reasonable.
In the same vein, Google's book rights registry should be made
publicly available, and the registry should rigorously protect the
moral rights of works that it includes. Why should Google become
sole owners of the digitized copies of orphan works? In such a
case, Google's monopoly over information would dwarf any
monopoly over knowledge previously known-including the very
strongest examples of copyright protection. Given that the hard
copies of books are likely to fall into obsolescence over time,
Google's power over knowledge could be unimaginable. This is
particularly the case where materials from developing countries, or
historical materials, are concerned. 16 1 The well-known adage that
See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("[T]he notion that a court-approved settlement agreement can release the copyright
interests of individual rights owners who have not voluntarily consented to transfer is a
troubling one.").
161 Google has undertaken at least two interesting projects involving the digitization of
ancient books and works from developing countries, in Mysore, India, and in Florence
160
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"Absolute power corrupts absolutely" comes to mind. It would
probably be best to spare Google so extreme a test of its

motivations.162
VI. CREATIVE COMMONS: AN AMERICAN MORAL RIGHT?
The protection of moral rights in the Creative Commons, and
by its ideological and practical precursor, the Free Software
movement, has profound implications in the American context. 163
In this regard, several points should be noted.
First and foremost, the recognition of moral interests in these
open access movements occurs in what is very nearly a legislative
vacuum in the United States. With the exception of VARA, there
is no relevant federal legislation; Dastar appears to have closed off
both American case law and unfair competition under the Lanham
Act as potential vehicles for the protection of moral rights.
Accordingly, the "moral rights" protected under the Creative
Commons licenses are created by those licenses, and the extent of
those moral rights is comprehensively defined by their terms.
Secondly, the essentially contractual nature of moral rights
under the licenses is well worth noting. They are rights that exist
above and beyond copyright legislation in the United States, and
and Rome. See Google to Digitise 800,000 Books at Mysore Varsity, HINDUSTAN TIMES,
May 20, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=4e4d6d35-ef7f4e42-808c-589ea4540202; see also Google to Scan One Million Books from Rome and
Florence Libraries, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
google/7415306/Google-to-scan-one-million-books-from-Rome-and-Florencelibraries.html.
162 But Colin Tapper notes that, "[w]hile . . . such a monopoly would be highly
undesirable, I am dubious whether it would ever be achieved considering the ease and
incidence of multiple copying of virtually anything once put into digital form." E-mail to
author (July 14, 2010) (on file with author).
163 It is well worth noting that those implications will generally not exist for other
countries. In particular, the recognition of moral rights through Creative Commons
licenses is of little practical significance in most European and Asian jurisdictions, as
their presence simply supplements existing legislative provisions on moral rights in those
countries. In Canada and the United Kingdom, the specification that "nothing in this
license amounts to a waiver of moral rights" is significant: since both countries allow
moral rights to be waived, it is important to establish that the release of a work under a
Creative Commons license does not involve any implicit waiver of moral rights in those
jurisdictions.
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they derive their force from the mutual agreement of author and
"user" of the work. As such, their effectiveness depends on the
broader environment for the recognition and enforcement of
contracts. It should be noted that the same holds true, more
generally, for the suspension of copyright rules that the Creative
Commons licenses attempt to enforce. The genius of the Creative
Commons system hangs on the principle of freedom of contract,
one of the sturdiest branches of the common law in the United
States.
These features of the Creative Commons system lead to the
question of whether a contract-based scheme can provide sufficient
protection for moral rights. In fact, a contractual approach to
establishing and enforcing moral rights suffers from at least two
major limitations. First, the dependence of contract on mutual
agreement means that the recognition of moral rights is subject to
the willingness of a "user" of a work to recognize them. Within
the Creative Commons system, this does not present any special
problems, because the use of the work is offered for free, and a
member of the public who uses it agrees to this arrangement.
Indeed, in some sense, the author trades his or her right of
economic remuneration, guaranteed by U.S. copyright law, for the
recognition of his or her moral rights under the terms of the
Creative Commons license. For many authors, this involves
potential advantages-a broader opportunity for the distribution of
the work, as well as improved potential for the growth of his or her
reputation, at least within the community of Creative Commons
users.
However, a contract-based solution for the recognition of
authors' moral rights in a more traditional publishing scenario has
Above all, the inequality of
well-remarked shortcomings.
bargaining power that typically characterizes author-publisher
relationships means that relatively few authors will be in a position
to enforce substantial recognition of their moral rights by

contractual means. 164
Germany has adopted a law that specifically attempts to address this issue. See
Gesetz zur Starkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebem und austibenden KUnstlern
[Law to Strengthen the Contractual Position of Authors and Performing Artists], Mar. 22,
16
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A second and more disturbing weakness of the Creative
Commons approach is the fact that these moral rights are
recognized only in the absence of economic rights in a work. This
trade-off has very wide implications for the American psyche. It
suggests that the copyright debate in the United States has become
polarized to an alarming degree. Copyright in the United States is
defined by dichotomies, and authors must choose between
economic rights-which can be secured, as far as digital
technology allows, by means of traditional publishing-and moral
rights, which depend on the Creative Commons formula. This
conclusion is reinforced by the definite narrowing trend in the
interpretation of legislative measures and case precedent, notable
at least since Dastar. In the past, economic doctrines such as the
right to authorize derivative works have been willingly substituted
for legislated moral rights; but current trends suggest that the
application of existing copyright doctrines to moral rights will be
increasingly limited. Accordingly, there is no real middle ground.
As things stand, barring the questionable opportunities available
through copyright contracts, an American author cannot expect to
secure both earnings from his work, and rights of attribution and
integrity in it. He or she must choose between the two.
There is undoubtedly an important lesson to be learned from
the presence of moral rights in open access movements. It is a
fundamental point of principle: moral rights belong in the
technological environment. But enforcing their presence will
depend on the confluence of legislation, precedent, and the
example of contractual licensing provided by the Creative
Commons movement. Moral rights should not be available only as
an alternative to economic compensation for an author's work.
Unless and until new models develop for the effective practical
support of creative work, moral rights and economic rights should
work together.
Indeed, moral rights can help to accomplish a much-needed
and exceptionally difficult task: the reconciliation of the public
interest and corporate interests in the copyright world. Between
2002, BGBL. I at 3656 (Ger.), availableat http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/de/
de094en.pdf.
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these two opposing sides, moral rights can act as a bridge. They
can do so by placing authors and authorship at the center of the
debate about the nature and extent of rights in culture, reorienting a
discussion that veers between the extremes of absolute ownership
and free use. For the sake of creative individuals, the debate
surrounding copyright rules deserves to be transformed into a
three-way discussion-an enlargement of dialogue that moral
rights can quite naturally facilitate.
CONCLUSION

In many ways, a natural empathy exists between open access
movements and moral rights. Both represent fundamentally anticorporate approaches to creative work. Each focuses on human
rights in its own way-for open access movements, the rights of
the public; for moral rights, the rights of the author. The two
ideals also share common concerns about the cultural sphere.
Moral rights seek to protect culture by maintaining the connection
between the human personality and creative work. Copyleft hopes
to promote it by encouraging people to use and re-use culture to
create new culture.
Both models have value, but the culture that emerges from
each will be different. Even copyleft recognizes that there are
limits to "creative destruction": with no sense of preservation at
all, even the "free" culture of copyleft cannot exist. This probably
explains the migration of moral rights ideas into copyleft, which
recognizes attribution and integrity as important principles in the
digital environment.
An examination of alternatives to copyright supports the theory
that moral rights will have a place, not only in the cultural
landscape of the future, but also, within the cultural communities
that are most determined to reject copyright law. But the theory of
moral rights has much to learn from anti-copyright movements.
Like them, its growth should develop as a grassroots phenomenon.
The successful enforcement of moral rights will depend largely on
the public-its awareness of moral rights and its willingness to
support authors. Moral rights laws without public support would
be hollow laws, ironically devoid of moral credibility.
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In the digital context, public education means democratic
education. Technology can be said to have brought democracy to
culture by placing the tools for its creation and development within
the reach of the public. But the ability of the public to make use of
these tools depends largely on the initiative of individuals-their
interest, their engagement with culture, their determination to
educate themselves. The relationship of hierarchy between author
and public has been altered fundamentally; in the digital
environment, it more closely resembles a circular relationship of
mutual communication and exchange among relative equals. At
different times, individuals may find themselves at different points
in the cycle of creativity, sometimes using, sometimes shaping,
sometimes creating new work. And this brings us to the real
originality of the Digital Age. The author is no longer an outsider;
he, or she, is within each one of us. By a shift of focus, moral
rights can help us to recognize and release this exciting new
potential.

Notes & Observations

